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The first essay looks how the disability wage gap as well as the gender, race, 
and ethnicity wage gaps are affected by macroeconomic conditions. Even though a 
large literature looks at the trends of these wage gaps, very little research considers 
their cyclicality. I use the SIPP linked to administrative earnings records to look at 
how these gaps vary with local labor market conditions from 1978 to 2010. For annual 
earnings, the disabled and blacks seem to fare better than their counterparts as labor 
market conditions worsen while women seem to fare worse than men, and the results 
are mixed for Hispanics. For hourly earnings, the results are largely mixed and 
inconclusive. There is also evidence that these results vary by decade. 
The second essay asks whether the gender gap in total compensation is smaller 
than the gender wage gap.  One potential explanation for the observed gender wage 
gap is that men and women value the nonwage aspects of a job differently. I construct 
two individual level measures of total compensation – one using supplemental CPS 
data on employer contribution to health insurance premiums and one using the NLSY 
linked to employer cost data.  I find that the observed gender gap resulting from these 
measures of total compensation is almost identical to the observed gender gap in 
wages. 
The third essay considers how parents allocate scarce resources among 
children with different levels of initial endowment.  Parents that are interested in 
maximizing the return on their investment might reinforce initial conditions, but 
parents motivated by equity might compensate.  I use the SIPP to directly measured 
health endowment as whether the child has any health conditions and parental 
investment as the frequency with which parents do various activities with each child.  
The results show that there is some evidence that parents do not invest equally in 
children of different health endowments, but the evidence is far from overwhelming.  
Moreover, the results differ depending on parents’  education and the children’s  age  
group.  In general, these results seem to indicate that pattern of parental behavior 
depends crucially on the specific investment.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
WAGE GAPS OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE: 
Disability, Gender, Race, and Ethnicity 
 
Chen Zhao1 
 
ABSTRACT 
A large literature documents how the disability wage gap, as well as the 
gender, race, and ethnicity wage gaps, have changed over time, but there is little 
research looking at how these wage gaps are affected by macroeconomic conditions. 
Due to discrimination or for compositional reasons, the disabled, women, blacks, and 
Hispanics could well be more adversely affected by economic downturns than their 
counterparts. These groups may also fare better in adverse labor market conditions 
because of, again, compositional reasons or because of selection into particular 
industries or occupations that are less cyclical. I use restricted access SIPP data that 
has been linked to administrative earnings records from the Social Security 
Administration to look at how the gap in earnings and wages faced by individuals with 
various types of disabilities as well as women, blacks, and Hispanics varies with the 
level of the local unemployment rate from 1978 to 2010. For annual earnings, the 
disabled and blacks seem to fare better than their counterparts as labor market 
                                                        
1 Cornell University, Department of Economics, Ithaca, NY  14853.  Email: cz92@cornell.edu 
I am grateful to John Abowd, Richard Burkhauser, John Cawley, Shooshan Danagoulian, Bill Erickson, 
Kevin Hallock, Arun Karpur, Martha Stinson, and Michael Strain as well as participants in the Health 
Economics, Health Behaviors and Disparities lunch and the Labor Economics/Policy Analysis and 
Management seminar at Cornell University for their helpful comments. 
Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the U.S. Census Bureau.  All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential 
information is disclosed. 
 2  
conditions worsen while women seem to fare worse than men, and the results are 
mixed for Hispanics. For hourly earnings, the results are largely mixed and 
inconclusive. There is also evidence that these results vary by decade. For example, in 
the 1980s and 1990s, the disabled seem to fare downturns better than the non-disabled, 
but for the 2000s, the opposite appears to be true. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The economic disadvantage faced by people with disabilities and the 
wage/earnings gap faced by women, blacks, and Hispanics are well established in the 
literature (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Haveman and Wolfe, 2000; Fryer, 2011).    Of 
course, being disabled is very different than being female, black, or Hispanic since the 
former can be time variant and is, therefore, much more difficult to define.  
Nevertheless, all of these groups – the disabled, women, blacks, and Hispanics – can 
be  thought  of  as  being  somewhat  “economically  vulnerable”  and  this  paper  explores 
how their relative well-being in terms of earnings has changed over the course of the 
business cycle in the five most recent recessions in the US using linked administrative 
and survey data spanning the period 1978 to 2010. 
The labor market consequences of disability are well documented.  Not only do 
the disabled have a weaker attachment to the workforce and work fewer hours, they 
also earn lower wages than the non-disabled.  Haveman and Wolfe (1990) find that the 
ratio of the earnings of the disabled to the non-disabled ranges from just over half to 
three-quarters between 1962 and 1984; Burkhauser et al (2001) finds a steady decline 
in this ratio over the 1990s.  One of the main reasons for these results is that the 
disabled as a group have much less human capital.  As a result of the adverse labor 
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market consequences of disability, the disabled are much more likely than their non-
disabled counterparts to be living in poverty (Haveman and Wolfe, 2000).  
 The labor economics literature has also long documented a persistent wage gap 
faced by certain demographic groups, including women, blacks, and Hispanics.  
Numerous cross-sectional studies have looked at both the levels and trends of the 
wage gaps between these groups and their counterparts.  Of course, in any study that 
measures wage gaps, the marginal product of each worker is usually not observed and 
thus, interpreting the wage gap or searching for a casual mechanism is a much more 
difficult exercise than the simple measurement.  Explanations that are often put forth 
to explain these wage gaps between demographic groups include differences in human 
capital, different preferences, differences in non-cognitive skills and discrimination 
(Antonji and Blank, 1999; Bertrand, 2010). 
While the levels and general trends of the gender, race, ethnicity, and disability 
wage gaps are been explored at length, very few studies have looked at the cyclicality 
of these wage gaps and how they change as local labor market conditions change.  The 
empirical evidence would especially be of interest since economic theory does not 
have a clear prediction for the direction of the effect.  Possible self selection among 
the  more  “vulnerable”  groups  (women,  blacks,  Hispanics,  and  the  disabled)  into  
industries and occupations that are more shielded from cycle effects would lead to 
smaller earnings gaps at higher unemployment rates. However, employers may have 
greater ability to engage in taste-based discriminate during economic downturns since 
the perceived cost of discrimination may be greater in a tighter labor market, leading 
to larger earnings gaps as labor market conditions worsen. Compositional shifts as 
labor market conditions change could also impact earnings gaps in either direction 
depending on whether better or worse workers in each group are more likely to exit 
the labor force during economic downturns.  In addition, for the disability 
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comparisons, the population that self-identifies as being disabled may change as the 
unemployment rate changes and also affect earnings gaps depending on whether better 
or worse workers are more likely to self-identify as being disabled as labor market 
conditions deteriorate. 
Among the few studies to have looked at this question is recent research by 
Biddle and Hamermesh (2012), which finds evidence that women, Hispanics, and bad-
looking workers experience greater earnings disadvantages during cyclical downturns 
and after experiencing negative industry-specific demand shocks. These findings 
suggest that, perhaps, the disabled could also be more negatively affected by adverse 
labor market conditions relative to the non-disabled and invite research looking at the 
cyclicality of the disabled/non-disabled earnings ratio as well as the demographic 
wage gaps that Biddle and Hamermesh focus on. 
The literature on how the disabled fare in recessions compared to the non-
disabled is especially thin.  While there are hints in the literature that non-white 
disabled men in particular and perhaps, all disabled men, are disproportionately 
negatively affected by recessions, there are no in-depth studies looking at these 
effects, particularly as they relate to the more recent economic downturns. (Haveman 
and Wolfe, 1990; Daly, 1994; Burkhauser, et al, 2001) 
While this study considers the disability wage gap as well as the gender, race, 
and ethnicity wage gaps, there is reason to think that the cyclical behavior of the 
disability wage gap might differ from that for demographic wage gaps. As previously 
touched on, the disabled are different from the other economically vulnerable groups 
for two important reasons. First, disability is much more complex than gender, race, 
ethnicity, and even physical appearance.  There exists no obvious definition of 
disability and who should be included in each group when comparing the disabled to 
the non-disabled is difficult to determine.  This ambiguity makes estimation difficult 
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as the relevant effects will change as definitions and, therefore, relevant samples 
change. 
The second difference is that, as a group, the disabled have social insurance 
programs that attempt to ameliorate the economic disadvantages they face, which in 
turn may affect how questions about disability status are answered in surveys.  These 
social programs also affect incentives to join the labor force for those whose 
disabilities do not prevent working.  A large strand of literature documents the recent 
increase in SSDI rolls and the corresponding decline in labor force participation 
among the disabled.  (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999)  In the context of this study, the 
effect of these incentives may well be exacerbated during recessions.  Someone who 
may qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) or Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) programs may hold a job when jobs are plentiful, but may not look too 
hard when labor market conditions deteriorate.  As Haveman and Wolfe touched on 
this in their Handbook of Labor Economics chapter,  “[disabled] workers… are also 
more likely to experience lower earnings in a recession, leading to withdrawal from 
the work force if disability benefits provide a floor on the reservation wage of disabled 
workers.” 
This study uses a unique linked dataset, the SIPP Gold Standard File (GSF), to 
estimate the effect of local unemployment conditions on the disability, gender, race, 
and ethnicity wage gaps.  The GSF links nine panels of the SIPP (Survey of Income 
and Program Participation), conducted between 1984 and 2010, to the Social Security 
Administration’s earnings and benefit records from 1978 to 20102.  This data allows 
for the people surveyed in the nine SIPP panels, which normally span 2 to 4 years, to 
be observed (in terms of their earnings and receipt of benefits) for 32 years.  During 
                                                        
2 The Summary Earnings Records date back to 1951 but the Detailed Earnings Records only go back to 
1978.  See the data section for more information. 
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this 32-year period, there were five recessions, as determined by the NBER (National 
Bureau of Economic Research).3 
Because of its unique structure and length, the SIPP GSF allows for a more in-
depth analysis of this question than the dataset used by similar studies.  These data 
allow me to follow disabled and non-disabled respondents of the SIPP longitudinally 
over the course of four (or five depending on how they are counted) business cycles, 
which are preferable to the cross sectional data used by previous studies that have 
looked at trends in the disability earnings gap.  Also, the SIPP is better than the CPS 
(Current Population Survey) or ACS (American Community Survey), which is often 
used in these types of studies, because it asks detailed questions about functional 
limitations, conditions, and work limitations as opposed to simply asking about work 
limitations.  This captures much more of and, perhaps, a different part of the 
population that is disabled since how a person answers the work limitation question 
may  be  especially  swayed  by  a  person’s  specific  conditions  that  are not related to 
disability.  For example, Burkhauser, et al, 2010 shows that, compared to the working 
impaired, a much larger percentage of the non-working impaired reports being work 
limited.4 
Finally, since I know the state the person lives in during their time in the SIPP 
I am able to exploit state level variation in labor market conditions.  State level 
unemployment is a much finer measure of the labor market conditions that a person is 
facing compared to the national unemployment rate since at any given time, there is a 
substantial amount of variation in state-level unemployment rates. 
                                                        
3 The peaks are Jan 1980, July 1981, July 1990, March 2001, and December 2007.  The troughs are July 
1980, Nov 1982, March 1991, Nov 2001, and June 2009.  (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html) 
4 A conjecture about why this is could be is that, for example, a disabled person who is employed may 
not feel limited in the kind of work he can do since he is working while a disabled person who is not 
employed is more likely to feel work limited since he has not been able to find work. 
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My results show that the gap in annual earnings between the disabled (for both 
those with work limiting disabilities and those with difficulties and limitations) and 
the non-disabled shrinks as the labor market conditions worsen.  This also appears to 
be true for blacks when only considering years with positive earnings (the opposite is 
true when including years of zero earnings).  In contrast, my results indicate that the 
gender gap in annual earnings increases as the unemployment rate increases.  The 
results for Hispanics is largely inconclusive as are the results for hourly earnings, but 
however, some specifications do suggest that the Hispanic-white gap increases with 
the unemployment rate.  I also look at how these effects vary by business cycles and 
there is significant heterogeneity over time. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows – section two will discuss the 
literature on labor market outcomes for the disabled, the literature on the gender, race, 
and ethnicity wage gaps and how I will measure disability, section three will discuss in 
detail the restricted access data that I use, section four presents the estimation 
techniques, section five gives the results, and the last section provides a discussion. 
 
2. LITERATURE AND BACKGROUND ON MEASURING DISABILITY 
2.1 Related Literature on the Disabled 
Numerous studies have documented the earnings and employment trends of the 
disabled.  Two general trends emerge – the disabled face a large employment and 
earnings gap relative to the non-disabled and the employment rate of the disabled has 
declined steadily over the 1990s and 2000s  (Burkhauser, et al, 2001, 2010).  Much of 
this decline has been associated with the increase in SSDI and SSI rolls since the 
1990s and at least some of the increase in SSDI and SSI program participation can be 
attributed to a relaxation of eligibility requirements and an increase in income 
replacement rates.  (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999; Autor and Duggan, 2003) 
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The employment rate among disabled working-age men has been less than half 
of that of non-disabled working-age men since the early 1980s and has declined 
steadily since the 1990s to be almost one-fifth of that of their non-disabled 
counterparts (Burkhauser, et al 2010). Among working-age women, the employment 
ratio of the disabled is also much less than half of that of non-disabled women, but it 
has been increasing steadily through the 1980s and 1990s from 28.5% to 33.3% by 
1999 (Burkhauser, et al 2001). 
Both disabled men and women also have earnings that are far below those of 
non-disabled men and women.  The income of disabled men has declined from about 
60% to slightly less than 50% of that of non-disabled men from the early 1980s.  
Disabled  women’s  income  has  also  experienced  the  same  decline  from  about  60%  to  
about 50% of that of non-disabled women.  (Burkhauser, et al 2001) 
The existing research on how the labor market outcomes of the disabled fare 
over the business cycle relative to their non-disabled counterparts is much thinner.  
Daly (2004) finds evidence of strong cyclical patterns and that, for African American 
men, recessions have particularly negative effects on labor earnings over the 1970s 
and 1980s.   This study is limited in that she only looks at disabled/non-disabled 
earnings ratios and also in that she looks at a very limited population.   Haveman and 
Wolfe (1990) look at the economic well being of the disabled from 1962 to 1984 and 
find especially strong negative effects from the recession of 1982 on the relative 
wellbeing of the disabled.  This study also only looks at earnings ratios and does not 
employ more rigorous regression analysis.  While these studies hint at cyclical effects 
on the relative wellbeing of the disabled and that adverse labor market conditions are 
particularly tough for the disabled, a more rigorous analysis using better and more 
recent data is warranted. 
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2.2 Related Literature on Demographic Wage Gaps 
The wage penalties associated with women, blacks, and Hispanics is well-
established in the literature and there are decades worth of papers looking at the levels 
and trends of these wage gaps as well as reasons for why they might exist (Antonji and 
Blank, 1999; Blau and Kahn, 2000) with much of analysis  based  on  Becker’s  taste-
based approach (Becker 1957).   
However, the literature on the cyclicality of these wage gaps is much thinner.  
The most relevant study, Biddle and Hamermesh (2012), finds evidence that women, 
Hispanics, and bad-looking workers experience greater earnings disadvantages during 
cyclical downturns and after experiencing negative industry-specific demand shocks.  
Biddle and Hamermesh also introduce an equilibrium search model of how 
macroeconomic fluctuations could induce either an increase or a decrease in wage 
gaps between two groups of workers, one of which is preferred by some employers. 
Related studies have also looked at the disproportionate effects of the so-called 
Great Recession (2007-2009) on certain segments of the population, though without 
looking at earnings gaps in particular.  Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller (2012) finds 
particularly adverse effects from the Great Recession on men, blacks, Hispanics, 
young, and less educated individuals.  Elsby, Hobjin, and Sahin (2010) that the 
“young, male, less-educated, workers from ethnic minorities” were hit harder by this 
most recent downturn.  And, lastly, a recent Pew study find that the Great Recession 
had much larger negative effects on young individuals without a college education 
than those with at least a college education (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013). 
 
2.3 Other Related Literature on Business Cycles Effects 
 Dustmann, Glitz, and Vogel (2010) study the differential effects of business 
cycles on immigrants and natives in the UK and Germany.  Consistent with the 
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aforementioned studies on the effects of the Great Recession, the authors find 
“significantly  larger  unemployment  responses  to  economic  shocks  for low-skill 
workers relative to high-skilled workers and for immigrants relative to natives within 
the  same  skill  group.” 
Another strand of literature that is related to this study is the literature on the 
health effects of economic downturns.  Indeed, as discussed earlier, disability and 
health are not time invariant.  In a series of papers, Ruhm (2000, 2003, 2005, 2007, 
2008) has found that, though conventional wisdom provides the opposite intuition, 
poor macroeconomic conditions actually improve physical health, including risk of 
coronary heart disease.  This is despite an increase in income and use of medical 
services when the economy is better.  Mental health, however, is worsens during 
economic downturns.  Evidence points to a decline in physical activity and a decrease 
healthy behavior as working hours increase during economic expansions as a primary 
driver of this effect.  Indeed, both smoking among heavy users and body weight 
among the obese drop during downturns.  These effects matter for this study because 
the size of the disability earnings gap depends crucially on the characteristics of the 
population of people defined as disabled and health is another avenue through which 
economic conditions may affect disability status. 
 Macroeconomic conditions at time of graduation have also been shown to have 
persistent and negative effects on the labor market outcomes and health years down 
the road.  Oreopoulos, Wachter and Heisz (2006) and Kahn (2010) show that those 
who graduate in a recession suffer earnings losses that do not disappear until 10 to 15 
years after graduation.  Maclean (2012), in a similar, study finds similar effects on 
health rather than labor market outcomes for those who graduate in a bad economy. 
 
2.4 Measuring Disability 
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As previously discussed,  the  nature  of  disability  is  such  that  a  “right”  way  of  
defining and measuring the disabled population is ambiguous at best.  While the 
average person may characterize a paraplegic to be obviously disabled, someone with 
“milder”  form  of  a  spectrum  disorder will be much more difficult to label as either 
“disabled”  or  “non-disabled”.    Also,  depending  on  the  job  and  accommodations  made  
by  the  employer,  that  paraplegic  may  not  even  report  himself  as  having  a  “work  
limiting”  disability  in  a  survey.    The  definition matters greatly, however, as shown in 
Autor and Duggan (2003), which finds that the most significant factor in the growth of 
disability insurance (SSDI) usage is the 1984 change in the SSDI screening rules that 
define disability for the program. 
Even though there is a large literature spanning multiple fields concerned with 
various questions on disability and there are numerous laws, regulations, and social 
transfer programs targeted at the disabled, a clear and noncontroversial definition of 
disability does not exist.  Mashaw and Reno (1996) document twenty definitions of 
disability that are actively used for determining eligibility for transfer programs, 
government services, and statistical analysis.  Haveman and Wolfe (2000) show that 
the disability prevalence depends critically on the exact definition used, even within a 
specific dataset.  With disability so difficult to nail down, definitions often differ based 
on the purpose of the determination or the study.   
Complicating the matter for studies that use survey data where disability is 
self-reported is the fact that self-reporting of disability is influenced by social context 
(as with the paraplegic in the earlier example).  Factors that may influence whether a 
person reports himself as being disabled or work limited include the availability of 
benefit/transfer programs and workplace conditions.  If there are benefits to 
identifying oneself as being disabled, then over reporting is obviously a concern.  For 
work limitation questions, someone with a physical, sensory, or mental limitation may 
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not report himself as being disabled if the workplace provides sufficient 
accommodations  for  the  disability  or  if  the  person’s  productivity at his job is not 
affected by the disability.  Someone who is unemployed, on the other hand, may be 
more likely to report himself as being work limited compared to a person with the 
same condition or limitation who is employed. (Burkhauser, et al, 2010) 
In addition to these concerns, self-reports of disability have also been shown to 
not be time invariant.  This is true even when the underlying health of the person 
remains unchanged.  (Kirchner, 1996)  While the issues outlined above are obviously 
concerning, there is also some good news.  Several studies have demonstrated that 
self-reports of work limitations do correlate well with more objective, medically 
determined measures of disability.  (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999; LaRue, 1979; 
Maddox and Douglas, 1973; Nagi, 1969)  In addition, Benitez-Silva et al (2004) 
compare self-reports of work-preventing disability in the Health and Retirement Study 
to  the  decisions  made  by  medical  professions  on  those  individuals’  applications  for  
disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and finds that they 
are  “unable to reject the hypothesis that self-reported disability is an unbiased 
indicator  of  the  SSA’s  decision.”    Lastly,  Burkhauser  et  al  (2001)  compares  the  
employment trends of the disabled population in the National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS) and the CPS and finds them to be similar. 
For  this  study,  I  have  chosen  to  use  the  World  Health  Organization’s  
International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health (the ICF model).  In 
this  model,  disability  is  characterized  by  a  dynamic  relationship  between  a  person’s  
health, personal characteristics, and the physical and social environment in which he 
lives.  These ICF concepts can be used to create a definition of disability.  The first 
concept is that of a health condition, which, in the ICF model, is required to be present 
for a person to be considered disabled.  The ICF model uses the International 
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Classification of Diseases, Tenth Edition (ICD-10) as a comprehensive listing of 
health conditions; included are diseases, injuries, health disorders, and other 
conditions  (Wittenburg, et al, 2006; WHO, 2001). 
The other concepts – impairment, activity limitation, and participation 
restriction – can be thought of as different categories of disability.  Impairment is 
defined  as  “a  significant  deviation  from,  or  loss  in,  body  function  or  structure.”      In  the  
SIPP Gold Standard, I am able to identify individuals with physical, mental, and 
sensory impairments.  Examples include loss of limb, blindness, and the presence of a 
mental health condition such as ADHD or depression.   
Activity  limitation  is  defined  as  “difficulty  in  executing  activities”  and  in  my 
data, I can identify both those individuals who find it difficult to or cannot execute 
activities of daily living (ADLs) and individuals who find it difficult to or cannot 
execute instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs).   Examples of ADLs are 
getting around the house, taking a shower, dressing, and eating.  Examples of IADLS 
includes going outside the home and keeping track of money and bills. 
Participation  restriction  is  defined  as  the  “inability  to  take  part  in  conventional  
life  situations  for  reasons  that  may  be  beyond  his  or  her  control.”    In  the  SIPP,  the  
main participation restriction questions are whether a person is limited in his ability to 
work and whether a person has the ability to work at all.  (Wittenburg, et al, 2006; 
WHO, 2001) 
My analysis uses these six categories of disabilities based on these concepts 
from the ICF model.  I look at individuals with work limitations, ADL limitations, 
IADL limitations, physical impairments, mental impairments, and sensory 
impairments.  I define an individual as being disabled if he fits into at least one of 
these categories.  My baseline results are computed for each of these six detailed 
categories of disability separately and also for two more aggregated categories – work 
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limiting disabilities and difficulties, which includes ADL limitation, IADL limitation, 
physical impairments, mental impairments, and sensory impairments.  The more 
aggregated categories take into account SIPP data on when the work limitation or 
difficulty began.  The other specifications that are estimated in addition to the baseline 
results are only computed for work limiting disorders and difficulties.  Table 1 details 
the specific SIPP questions that were used to construct each disability variable. 
Indeed, one of the advantages of using the SIPP is that it allows for using this 
more comprehensive definition of disability rather than simply using a work limitation 
question, which many studies using other survey data are forced to do.  The 
importance of being able to look beyond work limiting disabilities is underscored in 
Table 1.2, which shows cross tabulations of the various categories of disabilities.  The 
table shows the percent of people who, conditional on being in the disability category 
shown in the rows, are also in the disability category in the column.  In my data, while 
the incidence of any type of disability is much higher for those already in any of the 
other categories compared to the general population, it is also obvious that a much 
larger population is captured when all the disability categories are considered 
compared to when any single category, such as only those who describe themselves as 
having a work limiting disability, is considered. 
 
3. DATA 
 For this study, I use a unique restricted access linked dataset.  The SIPP Gold 
Standard File (GSF) is the result of a collaborative effort between the Census Bureau 
and the Social Security Administration (SSA).  Staff at the Census Bureau have 
harmonized a subset of variables from nine panels (1984, 1990 - 1993, 1996, 2001, 
2004, and 2008) of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and have 
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linked the individual level records to administrative earnings and benefits records from 
the SSA. 
 The SIPP is series of short panels that span 2 to 4 years and sample 
approximately 12,000 to 50,000 households for each panel with the more recent ones 
having larger sample sizes.  The first panel was in 1984 and the most recent is the 
2008 panel.  Each panel since the 1984 one has been integrated into the GSF.  The 
structure of the SIPP is somewhat complex.  Within a panel, households are 
interviewed once every four months and each interview is called a wave.  Each panel 
of the SIPP since 1984 has consisted of 8 to 13 waves.  During each wave, the month 
(out of the four) in which a household is interviewed is determined by its rotation 
group, which, in turn, determines the dates a household is referring to when answering 
questions.  Each interview consists of the core questions, which are asked during each 
wave, and topical questions, which vary from wave to wave. 
 The SIPP Gold Standard consists of all households from the SIPP that have 
provided a valid Social Security Number, which allows them to be linked to the 
administrative records (match rate about 80-90 percent for all panels) 5.  Only a subset 
of the variables from the SIPP is in the Gold Standard.  These include the following 
topic areas: demographics, marital history, labor market outcomes, welfare, health, 
and disability. 
The annual earnings records come from employer-provided W-2 reports to the 
IRS, which are sent to the SSA.  Depending on the level of detail, the earnings records 
span the years 1951 or 1979 to 2010.  There are two types of earnings records – the 
Detailed Earnings Record (DER), which include non-top-coded deferred and non-
FICA earnings dating back to 1978, and top-coded Summary Earnings Records (SER)                                                         
5 Based on observed demographic characteristics, selection does not seem to be a problem.  Previous 
work, such as Mazumder (2005) shows that correcting for selection using inverse probability weighting 
has little effect on regression results. 
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dating back to 1951.  These earnings records all represent annual income, however, 
and unfortunately, there is no way to construct an hourly wage from these records.   
The Gold Standard also includes administrative records on benefit receipt from the 
SSA’s  Old  Age,  Survivor,  and  Disability  Insurance  (OASDI)  and  Supplemental  
Security Income (SSI) programs.  These additional data allow me to explore how the 
self-reports of disability match up to the administrative records of disability insurance 
application and receipt, which are ultimately based medical evaluations and may be 
considered more objectives measures of disability. 
The  nature  of  the  “panel”  dataset  I  am  using  is  somewhat  complex.  For each 
individual, any variables that come from the administrative side (annual earnings, SSA 
benefit receipt, etc.) are available for a much longer period of time than the variables 
that come from the SIPP.  The SIPP variables are only available for the period of time 
that the person was in the SIPP for.  While some of these are time-invariant (race, 
gender, date of birth, etc.), others, including disability, may change over time.  
Therefore, I am forced to make assumptions about these variables for the years in 
which the individual is not in the SIPP.  I explain in more detail below where I have to 
make these assumptions.  As an example, for someone in the 2004 SIPP panel, I have 
annual earnings data for that individual from 1978 to 2010, but I only observe the state 
of residence from 2004 to 2006 and I have to assume the state of residence from 1978 
to 2003 and from 2007 to 2010.6 
The annual earnings measure that I use in this study is a combination of the 
DER and the SER due to the difference in coverage between the two variables.  
Following the SIPP GSF Codebook and previous studies using these data7 and after                                                         
6 Robustness checks were done to test the sensitivity of these assumptions and in general, they did not 
qualitatively affect the main results.  Also, as an additional robustness check, I estimated the baseline 
results while not using any observations from years after a person was in the SIPP and the results were 
qualitatively the same to those in Table 9. 
7 See, for example, Rutledge (2011). 
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examining the SER and DER records, I use the SER record for all years where the 
individual has zero non-FICA earnings and when the SER record is not top-coded.  
For the years where there are non-FICA earnings or where the SER record is top-
coded at the FICA maximum, then I use the sum of the DER FICA earnings variable 
and the DER non-FICA earnings variable.8 
There is also a total earnings variable and a total hours worked in the SIPP 
Gold Standard, which comes from the SIPP core questions.  As previously described, 
these are only available for each individual for the years in which s/he is in the SIPP, 
which means that, for each individual, there are only a few years worth of these 
variables.  I divide total earnings by total hours worked to obtain an hourly earnings 
variable for each individual.  These only exist for when an individual is working.9 
 The disability variables that I use come from both  the  SIPP’s  core  set  of  
questions and Functional Limitation Topical Module, which is asked at least once for 
every panel between 1984 and 2008.  Very detailed questions about medical 
conditions, physical, mental, and sensory limitations, as well as difficulty performing 
tasks are asked of all respondents at least 15 years old.  These questions are used to 
create variables on the GSF that indicate whether each individual has work limitations, 
ADL limitations, IADL limitations, physical impairments, mental impairments, and/or                                                         
8 Results were also estimated using the sum of the DER earnings variables as a measure of annual 
earnings and just the SER as a measure of annual earnings.  The directions of the effects of interest 
were the same using these annual earnings measures. 
9 When comparing results based on the annual earnings variables from the SSA data and the SIPP 
hourly earnings variable from the SIPP data, it is important to keep in mind the extensive literature 
showing where the administrative data and the survey data are sometimes at odds with each other.  
Gottschalk and Huynh (2010) assumes that the SSA data is the true measure of earnings and finds that 
workers with low earnings tend to overstate their earnings, while respondents with high earnings tend to 
underreport their earnings in SIPP.  Cristia and Swasbish (2007) uses very similar methodology to find 
that measurement error in the survey data is negatively correlated with true earnings (administrative 
data).  Dragoset and Fields (2008) uses the same data to find that results based on administrative and 
survey data are similar qualitatively but not identical that, quantitatively, magnitudes are often very 
different.  Unlike the other studies, Abowd and Stinson (2011) do not assume that the administrative 
data is the correct measure of earnings.  They find that the DER earnings variables are on average 
higher than the SIPP earnings variables and there is more variation due to unobservables in the 
administrative data than the survey data. 
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sensory impairments as defined by the ICF model of disability.  Table 1.1 shows the 
original questions from the SIPP and which ICF disability category they were mapped 
to in creating the SIPP GSF.10  The mapping is based on that used in Wittenburg and 
Nelson (2006).  For each disability category, a person is defined as having that 
impairment/limitation is he answers yes to any of the questions in that category as 
defined in Table 1.1.11 
 The Functional Limitation topical module also asks when  a  person’s  work-
limiting disability and difficulties (again, these are ADL or IADL restrictions and 
physical/mental/sensory impairments) began.  This allows me to partially distinguish 
when a person is disabled from years when s/he is not.  Unfortunately, each individual 
only answers the disability questions for the years where s/he is in the SIPP.  
Therefore, going back from the years the individual is in the SIPP, I can distinguish 
the years s/he was disabled from the years s/he was not, but going forward from those 
years to the end of the SSA data (2010), I have to assume that anyone who is disabled 
continues to be disabled.12,13 
                                                        
10 The later panels had more questions than the earlier panels and when the harmonization across panels 
was done, all available questions were used.  In each panel, a person is defined as having a, for example 
physical impairment, if he answered yes to any of the physical impairment questions that were asked 
during that panel. 
11 The SIPP Gold Standard at this point looks at the answers to the work and functional limitations 
questions at a point in time and does not consider how the answers to questions that are asked more than 
once change.  This might be cause for concern as it has been shown that self-reports sometimes change 
over time while underlying health conditions do not. 
12 For most detailed disability categories (ADL restriction, IADL restriction, physical impairment, 
mental impairment, and sensory impairment), I do not know when the disability began because many 
people are in multiple detailed disability categories and it is vague which is being referred to when the 
individual is asked the date the difficulty began.  Since the results are estimated for both the more 
detailed disability categories and the more aggregated work limitation/difficulty disability categories 
and the same general qualitative results hold, these assumptions do not seem to matter too much.  In 
addition, I estimated the baseline results assuming that year the difficulty began applies to each detailed 
disability category and the results were qualitatively the same to those in Table 1.10. 
13 As a robustness check, I estimated the baseline results using on those years where individuals were in 
the SIPP and years before individuals were in the SIPP and the results were very similar to those 
presented in Table 1.9. 
  
TABLE 1.1: SIPP VARIABLES USED TO CREATE DISABILITY VARIABLES BY PANEL 
     
 ICF Category 1996 - 2008 Panels 1990 - 1993 Panels 1984 Panel 
Had a work-limiting physical or mental condition Work Limitation EDISABL DISAB SC1460 
Had work-preventing  physical/mental/health condition Work Limitation EDISPREV   
Health or condition preventing work Work Limitation EJOBCANT TM8924, TM8332 TM8470 
Use of a hearing aid Sensory EHEARAID   
Difficulty seeing words/letters in newspaper print Sensory ESEEDIF TM8810 TM8336 
Ability to see words and letters in print at all Sensory ESEENOT TM8812 TM8338 
Difficulty hearing what is said in conversation Sensory EHEARDIF TM8814 TM8344 
Ability to hear what is said at all Sensory EHEARNOT TM8816 TM8346 
Difficulty having speech understood Sensory ESPEECHD TM8818  
Ability to understand speech at all Sensory ESPEECHC TM8820  
Difficulty lifting and carrying 10 pounds Physical EDIF10 TM8822 TM8350 
Ability to lift and carry 10 pounds at all Physical ECANT10 TM8824 TM8352 
Difficulty lifting and carrying 25 pounds Physical EDIF25   
Ability to lift and carry a 25 pound bag at all Physical ECANT25   
Difficulty pushing or pulling large objects Physical EPUSHD   
Ability to push or pull large objects at all Physical EPUSHC   
Difficulty standing on being on feet Physical ESTANDD   
Difficulty sitting Physical ESITD   
Difficulty stopping, crouching, or kneeling Physical ESTOOPD   
Difficulty reaching over head Physical EREACHD   
Difficulty using hand and fingers Physical EGRASPD   
Ability to use hands and fingers at all Physical EGRASPC   
Difficulty walking up a flight of stairs Physical ESTAIRSD TM8826 TM8358 
Ability to walk up a flight of stairs at all Physical ESTAIRSC TM8828 TM8360 
Difficulty walking a quarter of a mile Physical EWALKD TM8830 TM8354 
Ability to walk a quarter of a mile at all Physical EWALKC TM8832 TM8356 
Difficulty using an ordinary telephone Physical ETELED TM8834  
Ability to use a telephone at all Physical ETELEC TM8836  
Learning disability  Mental ELDIS TM8902 
TM8462** Mental retardation Mental EMR TM8904 Developmental disability Mental EDEVDIS TM8906 
Alzheimer's disease Mental EALZ TM8908 
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Table 1.1 Continued 
 ICF Category 1996 - 2008 Panels 1990 - 1993 Panels 1984 Panel 
Other mental or emotional condition Mental EOTHERM TM8910  
Frequently depressed or anxious Mental EANXIOUS   
Trouble getting along with other people Mental ESOCIAL   
Trouble concentrating Mental ECTRATE   
Trouble coping with stresses Mental ECOPE   
Difficulty getting around inside of the home ADL EINDIF TM8838 TM8366 
Difficulty getting in and out of bed or a chair ADL EBEDDIF TM8842 TM8370 
Difficulty taking a bath or shower ADL EBATHDIF TM8844 TM8424 
Difficulty dressing ADL EDRESSD TM8846 TM8424 
Difficulty walking ADL EWALK2D TM8848 *  
Difficulty eating ADL EEATDIF TM8850 TM8424 
Difficulty using or getting to the toilet ADL ETOILETD TM8852 TM8424 
Difficulty going outside the home IADL EOUTDIF TM8840 TM8362 
Difficulty keeping track of money or bills IADL EMONEYD TM8854  
Difficulty preparing meals IADL EMEALSD TM8856 TM8398 
Difficulty doing light housework IADL EHWORKD TM8858 TM8396 
Difficulty taking the right amount of medicine IADL EMEDD   
Year when work limitation began  TLMTYR TM8310 TM8456 
Year when difficulty began  TYEAR1   
Note: * Not in 1990 Panel. **This question asks what condition causes the respondent's difficulties.  If one of the mental conditions is specified as main 
condition causing difficulty, then the respondent is coded as having a mental disability in the SIPP GSF. 
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TABLE 1.2: DISABILITY CATEGORY CROSS TABULATIONS 
        
Disability Category Work Limitation Difficulty 
Activities 
of Daily 
Living 
Restriction 
Instrumental 
Activities of 
Daily 
Living 
Restriction 
Physical 
Impairment 
Mental 
Impairment 
Sensory 
Impairment 
Work Limitation   57.76% 16.15% 18.98% 44.68% 24.22% 25.46% 
Difficulty 6.55%   13.09% 12.18% 49.05% 36.98% 35.63% 
Activities of Daily Living 
Restriction 6.71% 47.93%   62.86% 93.05% 35.35% 35.73% 
Instrumental Activities of 
Daily Living Restriction 8.10% 45.82% 64.58%   89.87% 44.41% 37.93% 
Physical Impairment 4.02% 38.91% 20.16% 18.95%   21.99% 21.58% 
Mental Impairment 4.42% 60.05% 16.68% 20.23% 46.81%   20.32% 
Sensory Impairment 4.90% 60.39% 16.54% 17.09% 46.11% 21.10%   
                
Note: This table reports the percent of observations (persons, not person-years) that are in column category conditional on being in row category 
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Table 1.3 checks how well the SIPP disability data matches with the SSA 
administrative data on disability insurance receipt.  Those who receive disability 
insurance  are  required  to  have  a  doctor’s  examination  to  establish  their  inability  to  
work.  In my sample as a whole, just over 3 percent of the observations are on 
disability insurance.  Of those who indicate in the SIPP that they are unable to work, 
just under half are on disability insurance.  Of those with work limiting disabilities, 
but not work preventing disabilities according to the SIPP data, about 13 percent are 
on disability insurance and of those with difficulties that are not described as work 
preventing in the SIPP data, just over 6 percent are on disability insurance.  These 
numbers show that, consistent with the previous literature on this issue, while the 
survey and the administrative data on disability are certainly very correlated, there 
remain significant differences in the disabled populations defined in each dataset. 
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TABLE 1.3: SSA DISABILITY VERSUS SIPP DISABILITY 
     
   
Percentage on 
Disability Insurance 
SIPP Disability Category No Work Yes No 
Work Limitation 
Yes 
Yes 44.05% 55.95% 
No 13.44% 86.56% 
No 
Yes* 11.74% 88.26% 
No 2.77% 97.23% 
Difficulty 
Yes 
Yes 46.50% 53.50% 
No 6.24% 93.76% 
No 
Yes** 28.13% 71.87% 
No 2.01% 97.99% 
No Work Yes N/A 42.52% 57.48% 
No 1.73% 98.27% 
     Overall   3.12% 96.88% 
     Avg. Annual 
Earnings  
 
$2,610 $30,304 
          
Note: This table reports the percent of observations (person-years) that are receiving 
disability insurance payments according to the Social Security Administration's 
Master Beneficiary Records conditional on whether he/she has a work limiting 
disability, a difficulty, and/or a work preventing disability in the SIPP data.  The 
overall percent of the sample that is receiving disability insurance payments is also 
reported as is the average annual earnings (according to the Social Security 
Administration's records) of those receiving and those not receiving disability 
insurance payments.  *Only 0.16% of all observations have Work Limit = No, No 
work = yes; ** Only 0.74% of all observations have Difficulty = No, No work = yes. 
 
 Also, the proportion of the observations that self-report as being disabled is not 
constant over the business cycle.  As shown in Chart 1.1, both the proportion that 
report work limiting disabilities and the proportion that report difficulties seem to 
increase with the level of the state unemployment rate.  These results would be 
consistent with one might expect based on intuition and the previous literature on the 
time-variant nature of self-reports on disability status. 
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CHART 1.1:  PROPORTION DISABLED BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
 
I merged the GSF with state level unemployment rates for each year between 1978 
and 2010 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Chart 1.2 shows the unemployment rate 
in each state for each year between 1978 and 2012 as a point as well as the national 
average (black line).  It is clear from this chart that, each year, the range between the 
state with the lowest unemployment rate and the state with the highest unemployment 
rate is large.  Even in a year with little variance, such as 2000, the state with the lowest 
level of the unemployment rate was at 2.3% while the state with the highest level was 
at 6.7%.  In a year with a very high level of variance, such as 1983, state 
unemployment rates ranged from 5.3% to 17.4%.14
                                                        
14 As an extension of the analysis presented in the Results section, I also estimated the baseline results 
using the state level employment to population ratio rather than the unemployment rate.  The results 
were very similar to the results in Table 9.  This should not be very surprising as, in general, the state 
level employment to population ratio tracks the state level unemployment rate pretty well. 
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CHART 1.2: STATE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY YEAR: 1978-2010
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To create my analysis sample, I restrict the person-year observations to only 
those where the individual was between the ages of 25 and 64 to reduce any 
confounding issues with education and retirement.  For people who indicate in the 
SIPP that their disability prevents them from working, I use that information along 
with when they started not being able to work to eliminate those person-year 
observations since I am interested in looking at comparing those who are disabled but 
still able to work to those who are not disabled. 
 I also eliminate those who are out of scope for disability questions, those with 
missing values for disability questions, those without a valid Social Security number 
(for matching to the administrative data), those whose disability prevents them with 
working, those with missing earnings data, those with missing values for the control 
variables, and those with annual earnings of zero every year between 1978 and 2010.  
The reductions to the sample size caused by each of these cuts to the data are show in 
Table 1.4.  The greatest reduction by far comes from eliminating those person-years 
under age 25 and those over age 64.  This is especially true for the SSA Sample as the 
earlier years are skewed toward older individuals due to the structure of the data. 
 For the analysis where I am looking at annual earnings, my total sample size is 
5,752,980 person-years.  These represent about 255,398 people, which means that 
each person is represented with 22.5 years of data on average.  The samples sizes for 
the analysis where I am looking at hourly earnings are much smaller at about 380,323 
person-years, representing just over 168,816 people, which means each person is 
represented with just over 2 years of data on average.  The disparity reflects the 
structure of the linked survey-administrative dataset.  There are fewer years associated 
with each person in the analysis of hourly earnings because these only use the years 
where each individual  was  in  the  SIPP  rather  than  each  person’s  SSA  records  from  
1978 to 2010. 
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TABLE 1.4: SAMPLE SIZES  
    
CUT TO SAMPLE 
Person-Years  
Person-
Years Persons  
    
 25,628,229 776,613  
Age 25 to 64 9,284,804 460,130  
Disability not in scope and SSN not valid 8,876,017 407,254  
Work Preventing Disability 8,603,849 402,485  
Disability information missing 6,523,088 292,808  
Earnings information missing 6,431,787 287,794  
Control variables missing 5,778,002 257,929  
No Years of Positive Earnings 5,752,980 255,398  
       
 
 
    
TABLE 1.5: SIPP PANELS 
      
SIPP 
PANEL 
SSA Sample SIPP Sample Number of 
Wave 1 
Eligible 
Households 
Person-
Years Persons 
Person-
Years Persons 
      
1984 377,027 15,411 17,909 9,693 20,897 
1990 693,230 28,642 34,739 18,617 19,800 
1991 425,611 17,622 21,575 11,526 15,626 
1992 553,926 23,117 28,746 15,213 21,577 
1993 581,821 24,537 29,790 16,001 21,823 
1996 888,141 40,114 91,409 26,860 40,188 
2001 515,756 24,911 30,123 15,908 50,500 
2004 906,362 42,646 78,179 29,168 51,379 
2008 811,106 38,398 47,853 25,830 52,030 
            
Note: This table shows the number of person-years and the number of persons in each of the 
analysis samples that came from each of the nine SIPP panels as well as the number of 
households initially eligible to be interviewed for that SIPP panel. 
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Table 1.5 shows how many persons and person-years are from each of the ten 
panels of the SIPP that are in the GSF.  In addition, I list the number of households  
initially eligible for interview in wave 1 of the panel.15  The sample size from each 
panel roughly corresponds with the size of each panel, as one would expect. 
Table 1.6 contains the summary statistics for the sample where I am looking at 
annual  earnings  (“the  SSA  sample”).    The  first  column  represents  the  entire  sample,  
while the second column represents the person-years where the person has zero annual 
earnings.  The next few sets of columns present the disability and demographic 
comparisons.  For the SSA sample, these summary statistics show that those without 
disabilities are generally younger, better educated, have more work experience, more 
likely to be married, and more likely to be in managerial or professional careers.  
These trends are consistent with other research (Haveman and Wolfe, 2000).  Also, 
women, blacks, and Hispanics are less educated, less likely to be married, more likely 
to have children, and are in very different industries when compared to their 
counterparts.  Lastly, while race and ethnicity comparisons do not show large 
differences across industries, women are in very different industries than men. 
Table 1.7 shows the same comparisons for the sample where I am looking at 
hourly  earnings  (“the  SIPP  sample”).    While  many  of  the  same  broad  trends generally 
seem to be true in this sample, there are differences since this sample is much smaller 
than the SSA sample.  For example, in the SSA sample, disabled individuals have less 
work experience, but in the SIPP sample, disabled individuals have more work 
experience. 
                                                        
15 The  number  of  wave  1  eligible  households  is  taken  from  the  SIPP  User’s  Guide, Chapter 2.  URL: 
http://www.census.gov/sipp/usrguide/ch2_nov20.pdf 
   
TABLE 1.6: SUMMARY STATISTICS (ANNUAL EARNINGS SAMPLE) 
  ALL Zeros No Work Limit 
Work 
Limit 
No 
Difficulty Difficulty Male Female Not Black Black 
Not 
Hispanic Hispanic 
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 894,476 5,647,567 105,413 5,127,922 625,058 2,738,299 3,014,681 5,163,266 589,714 5,301,028 451,952 
Persons 255,398 134,253 252,853 2,545 232,966 22,432 121,754 133,644 227,946 27,452 233,891 21,507 
Age (years) 42 44 42 46 41 45 42 42 42 41 42 40 
Annual Earnings (Year 2000 $) $30,511  $0  $30,745  $17,955  $31,384  $23,347  $41,723  $20,327  $31,469  $22,120  $31,367  $20,473  
Disabled (Work Limit) % 1.8 3.4    0.9 9.9 2.0 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.3 
Disabled (Difficulty) % 10.9 14.4 10.0 58.6    10.0 11.7 10.8 11.3 10.9 10.2 
Female % 52.4 69.5 52.5 47.0 51.9 56.4    51.6 59.9 52.4 52.9 
Black % 10.3 10.9 10.3 9.2 10.2 10.6 8.6 11.7    10.5 7.7 
Hispanic % 7.9 10.6 7.9 5.8 7.9 7.4 7.8 7.9 8.1 5.9    
Married % 66.4 67.9 66.6 57.8 67.2 60.0 70.2 63.1 69.0 44.3 66.7 63.7 
Have Children % 75.0 81.1 75.0 72.6 74.6 78.4 72.1 77.7 74.7 77.9 74.6 79.9 
Education (less than HS) % 12.2 19.5 12.1 20.5 11.5 18.3 12.8 11.7 11.5 18.7 10.1 37.0 
Education (HS Degree) % 30.7 34.4 30.6 36.8 30.5 33.1 29.3 32.0 30.4 34.1 31.0 28.2 
Education (Some College) % 30.4 26.5 30.4 29.7 30.5 30.1 29.3 31.4 30.3 31.8 31.0 24.0 
Education (College Degree) % 17.1 13.6 17.3 8.9 17.8 12.0 17.8 16.5 17.9 10.3 18.0 7.4 
Education (Graduate Degree) % 9.5 6.0 9.6 4.2 9.9 6.5 10.8 8.3 10.0 5.1 10.0 3.4 
Experience (years) 22.0 24.5 21.9 27.4 21.5 25.9 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 21.8 
Industry 
Manufacturing % 14.0 8.6 14.0 15.1 14.1 13.4 19.2 9.3 14.1 13.3 14.0 15.1 
Wholesale/Retail 
Trade % 13.7 11.7 13.7 16.0 13.9 12.5 13.9 13.5 14.0 11.1 13.6 14.5 
Fire, Services, 
Public Admin, 
Military % 
41.6 31.5 41.7 35.0 42.0 37.7 31.3 50.9 40.9 47.6 41.9 37.7 
Ag, Mining, 
Const., Trans., 
Comm., Pub. 
Util.% 
11.6 8.1 11.6 10.3 11.7 10.3 18.7 5.1 11.7 10.5 11.4 14.2 
Occupation 
Managerial and 
Prof Specialty % 25.3 13.7 25.4 14.9 26.1 18.7 25.5 25.0 26.2 17.1 26.3 13.2 
Technical, Sales, 
and 
Administrative 
Support % 
24.3 18.9 24.3 23.6 24.6 21.7 15.1 32.7 24.4 23.4 24.7 20.2 
Other % 31.2 27.1 31.1 37.9 31.0 33.4 42.5 21.0 30.0 41.9 29.8 48.0 
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TABLE 1.7: SUMMARY STATISTICS (HOURLY EARNINGS SAMPLE) 
  ALL 
No 
Work 
Limit 
Work 
Limit 
No 
Difficulty Difficulty Male Female 
Not 
Black Black 
Not 
Hispanic Hispanic 
N (Person-Years) 380,323 374,267 6,056 333,414 46,909 188,137 192,186 340,597 39,726 348,925 31,398 
Persons 168,816 165,460 3,356 148,627 20,189 82,757 86,059 151,057 17,759 154,721 14,095 
Age (years) 42 42 44 41 45 42 42 42 41 42 40 
Hourly Earnings (Year 2000 $) $19.52 $19.63 $12.78 $19.78 $17.61 $23.37 $15.75 $20.07 $14.78 $20.02 $13.92 
Disabled (Work Limit) % 1.6    0.8 7.4 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.6 1.1 
Disabled (Difficulty) % 12.3 11.6 57.5    10.5 14.2 12.4 12.0 12.4 11.2 
Female % 50.5 50.6 46.7 49.5 58.1    49.4 59.9 50.7 48.2 
Black % 10.5 10.5 7.8 10.5 10.1 8.5 12.4    10.8 6.5 
Hispanic % 8.3 8.3 5.8 8.4 7.5 8.7 7.9 8.6 5.1    
Married % 67.3 67.4 61.6 68.3 60.3 72.2 62.5 69.7 46.9 67.4 66.2 
Have Children % 74.0 73.9 75.5 73.5 77.5 71.6 76.3 73.3 79.3 73.4 80.7 
Education (less than HS) % 8.8 8.6 19.2 8.2 12.8 9.8 7.8 8.4 12.5 6.8 31.2 
Education (HS Degree) % 29.5 29.3 38.4 29.1 31.9 29.1 29.9 29.0 33.5 29.5 28.6 
Education (Some College) % 31.9 31.9 29.2 31.6 33.8 30.5 33.2 31.5 35.6 32.3 27.6 
Education (College Degree) % 19.7 19.8 8.8 20.5 13.9 19.8 19.5 20.5 12.8 20.6 9.0 
Education (Graduate Degree) % 10.2 10.3 4.4 10.6 7.5 10.8 9.6 10.7 5.5 10.8 3.7 
Experience (years) 21.8 21.7 25.3 21.2 25.8 21.8 21.8 21.8 22.1 21.9 21.2 
Industry 
Manufacturing % 17.6 17.6 20.5 17.6 18.0 23.5 11.9 17.9 15.8 17.6 18.3 
Wholesale/Retail Trade % 15.2 15.2 19.0 15.2 15.4 15.5 15.0 15.6 11.8 15.1 16.3 
Fire, Services, Public 
Admin, Military % 52.6 52.7 46.1 52.5 53.2 38.4 66.4 51.7 59.6 53.1 47.0 
Ag, Mining, Const.,Trans., 
Comm., Pub. Util.% 14.3 14.3 13.7 14.5 13.0 22.4 6.3 14.5 12.6 14.0 18.0 
Occupation 
Managerial and Prof 
Specialty % 33.4 33.6 19.9 34.2 27.7 32.5 34.3 34.7 22.5 34.8 17.9 
Technical, Sales, and 
Administrative Support % 29.4 29.3 30.9 29.3 29.6 17.9 40.6 29.4 29.1 29.8 24.1 
Other % 36.8 36.7 48.5 36.1 42.1 49.3 24.6 35.5 48.1 35.0 57.5 
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4. METHODS 
 I start by looking at a simple breakdown of average annual earnings (SER and 
DER) for each level of the unemployment rate by disability status for each category of 
disability and by gender, race, and ethnicity.  These are shown in Charts 1.3 through 
1.7.  The secondary axes on these graphs show the percent of the total sample of 
person-years at that unemployment rate.  Charts 1.8 through 1.12 are similar, but show 
the percent of observations that have non-zero  earnings  (an  “employment  rate”)  by  
disability status and gender, race, and ethnicity at each rounded unemployment rate. 
In addition to these simple averages, I also use regression analysis utilizing 
both the administrative annual earnings records (SER and DER) and the hourly 
earnings from the SIPP. 
The general equation I am estimating for the disability comparisons is: 
 
 𝐼௜௦௧ =   𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐷௜௦௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑈௦௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑈௦௧𝐷௜௦௧ + 𝛽ସ𝑋௜௦௧ + 𝑣௦ + 𝜏௧ + 𝜀௦௧  (1) 
 
𝐼௜௦௧ is the natural log of individual i’s  annual earnings in a given year t and s denotes 
the state that individual i lives in.  𝐷௜௦௧ is an indicator variable for whether individual i 
is disabled.  As discussed before, disabled here can mean having work limitations or a 
difficulty, which includes ADL limitations, IADL limitations, physical impairments, 
mental impairments, and/or sensory impairments.   Separate results are estimated for 
both work limiting disabilities and difficulties.  The baseline analyses are also 
estimated for each detailed type of disability – work limitation, ADL limitations, 
IADL limitations, physical impairments, mental impairments, and/or sensory 
impairments.    
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CHART 1.3:  AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
LEVEL - DISABILITY (WORK LIMITATION) 
CHART 1.4:  AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
LEVEL - DISABILITY (DIFFICULTY) 
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CHART 1.5:  AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
LEVEL – GENDER 
 
CHART 1.6:  AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
LEVEL - RACE 
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CHART 1.7:  AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
LEVEL - ETHNICITY 
 
CHART 1.8:  EMPLOYMENT RATE BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE LEVEL - 
DISABILITY (WORK LIMITATION) 
 
Chart 8:  Employment Rate by Unemployment Rate Level
Disability (Work Limitation)
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CHART 1.9:  EMPLOYMENT RATE BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE LEVEL - 
DISABILITY (DIFFICULTY) 
 
 
CHART 1.10:  EMPLOYMENT RATE BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE LEVEL 
- GENDER 
 
Chart 9:  Employment Rate by Unemployment Rate Level
Disability (Difficulty)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
State Unemployment Rate
Pe
rc
en
t 
of
 O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s 
w
it
h 
N
on
-Z
er
o 
A
nn
ua
l 
Ea
rn
in
gs
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
N
um
be
r 
of
 P
eo
pl
e
Total Number of People Ratio (No Disability) Ratio (Disability)
Chart 10:  Employment Rate by Unemployment Rate Level
Gender
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CHART 1.11:  EMPLOYMENT RATE BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE LEVEL 
- RACE 
 
 
CHART 1.12:  EMPLOYMENT RATE BY UNEMPLOYMENT RATE LEVEL 
- ETHNICITY 
 
Chart 11:  Employment Rate by Unemployment Rate Level
Race
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Chart 12:  Employment Rate by Unemployment Rate Level
Ethnicity
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𝑈௦௧ is the unemployment rate in state s at time t.  𝑋௜௦௧ is a vector of control 
variables that include gender, race, ethnicity, educational attainment, marital status, 
number of children, experience, occupation and industry.  One reason to control for 
occupation and industry is that the labor market effects of disability could vary by 
industry and occupation.  For example, Kruger and Kruse (1995) find that those with 
computer skills do not suffer as negative of an earnings effect after the onset of a 
disability.   
 𝑣௦ are state fixed effects and  are year fixed effects.16,17  The year fixed 
effects allow me to abstract away from long-term aggregate labor market trends 
among minorities, women, and the disabled as well as changing attitudes toward these 
groups.  In addition, some states may experience higher or lower than average 
(national average) unemployment for long periods of time and these long-term state-
specific trends could be correlated with wage gaps between demographic groups or the 
disability wage gap as well as attitudes toward certain groups.  Including state fixed 
effects allows me to focus on temporary variation in state-specific labor market 
conditions. 
 For the demographic comparisons, the equation is very similar: 
 
𝐼௜௦௧ =   𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑀௜௦௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑈௦௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑈௦௧𝑀௜௦௧ + 𝛽ସ𝑋௜௦௧ + 𝑣௦ + 𝜏௧ + 𝜀௦௧  (2) 
 
                                                        
16 These results do no make use of weights.  Because of the nature of the SIPP Gold Standard File, 
Census Bureau staff generally do not recommend using the person level weights in the SIPP data and 
other researchers using these data also estimate unweighted regressions.  As robustness checks, I also 
estimated the baseline results using various person level weights and the results do not qualitatively 
differ from those presented in Table 1.7. 
17 The baseline results were also estimated using leads and lags of the local unemployment rate.  This 
did not change the results appreciatively. 
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The only difference is that 𝑀௜௦௧ is an indicator variable for whether individual i is 
female (for the gender gap analysis), black (for the race gap analysis), or Hispanic (for 
the ethnicity gap analysis). 
  When using administrative earnings records, I am able to look at the years 
1978 to 2010.  Even though the SIPP has a complex sequential and sometimes 
overlapping panel structure, there are SIPP earnings records for at least part of the year 
for all the years between 1984 and 2010.  Therefore I also estimate equations (1) and 
(2) using hourly earnings variables from the SIPP. 
 Since there is a social insurance program for the disabled and the decline in 
labor force participation among the disabled is well documented in the literature, I am 
also interested in the disabled, women, blacks, or Hispanics responding to adverse 
labor  market  conditions  by  leaving  or  being  “forced”  to  leave  employment  and  I  
estimate separate regressions removing years of zero annual earnings and keeping 
years of zero annual earnings.  When keeping the zeros, I only keep the ones that are 
between years of non-zero annual earnings. 
Because of the structure of the data, I can only observe the state an individual 
lives during the time he is in the SIPP.  I assume that for years before the first 
observation in the SIPP, the individual lives in the same state we first observe him in 
and for years after the last observation in the SIPP, he lives in the state we last observe 
him in.  Similar to the assumptions made about state of residence, I also have to make 
the assumptions about the time invariance of other control variables that are only 
available from the SIPP for the analysis using administrative earnings records. 
As variations of the baseline estimates using equations (1) and (2), I also 
estimated variations of these equations using, instead of the unemployment rate, an 
indicator for the unemployment rate being greater than 6% (using both annual and 
hourly earnings variables).  This can be interpreted a looking at years where is the 
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local  labor  market  is  “good”  versus  years  where  local  labor  market  conditions  are  
“bad.”  Lastly, I also estimated equations (1) and (2) by business cycle; that is, looking 
at the following periods of time in isolation to see if the effects of interest change over 
time: 1980-1990, 1990-2001, and 2001-2007. 
 
5. RESULTS 
 The simple averages of annual earnings at different levels of the state 
unemployment rate (rounded to the nearest integer) are shown in Charts 1.3 through 
1.7.  The disability comparisons (Charts 1.3 and 1.4) both seem to show that the gap 
between the non-disabled and the disabled is larger at lower levels of unemployment.  
Of course, it is important to keep in mind that the sample sizes are skewed toward 
lower unemployment rates with the higher levels of unemployment more scarcely 
populated and the average earnings measure also more noisy at those levels of 
unemployment.  This is shown by the bars that represent the percent of the sample in 
terms of people (not person-years) at each level of the unemployment rate. 
 Chart 1.5 shows the gender comparisons and there does not appear to be a clear 
effect either way looking just at the average level of annual earnings.  Chart 1.6 is the 
race comparison, which looks similar to the gender comparison in that a simple visual 
comparison does not yield a clear direction of effect.  Chart 1.7, however, the ethnicity 
comparison, looks more similar to the disability comparisons in Charts 1.3 and 1.4 
than the gender and race comparisons in Charts 1.5 and 1.6 in that the earnings gaps 
appears to be smaller at higher levels of the unemployment rate. 
 Charts 1.8 through 1.12 show  the  “employment  rate”  by  disability  status,  
gender, race, and ethnicity as well as the rounded level of the local unemployment 
rate.  While the fraction of observations with positive annual earnings decreases more 
for women as the local unemployment rate increases than it does for men, we do not 
  40  
see this same patter for the disabled, blacks, and Hispanics.  Again, the data is much 
noisier for these groups, especially at higher levels of unemployment where the 
sample sizes decrease drastically.  
 Before discussing the regression results, I first ran some logit regressions 
estimating the effect of disability, gender, race, and ethnicity on the probability of 
having zero annual earnings and the probability of having zero annual income from 
labor market earnings and disability insurance payments.  As mentioned before, my 
baseline analysis is done on a sample that includes years of zero annual earnings and a 
sample that does not, so it is first instructive to look at the differences in likelihood of 
having zero annual earnings among these groups.  These results are shown in Table 
1.8.  Each panel is separate group comparison and within each, the first column shows 
the results for when an indicator variable for zero annual earnings is the dependent 
variable and the second column shows the results for when an indicator variable for 
the sum of annual earnings and disability insurance payments is zero.  The results 
show that the disabled, especially those with work limiting disabilities, women, and 
Hispanics are more likely to experience years of zero earnings.  The inclusion of 
disability insurance payments partially reduces these effects for the two disability 
categories, but does not for women and Hispanics, as would be expected.  
    
 
TABLE 1.8: LOGIT RESULTS - PROBABILITY OF ZERO EARNINGS/INCOME 
       
DISABILITY (WORK LIMITIMATION)  DISABILITY (DIFFICULTIES) 
 
Annual 
Earnings 
Annual Earnings 
+ Disability 
Benefits   
Annual 
Earnings 
Annual Earnings 
+ Disability 
Benefits 
       
Odds Ratio 2.155 1.393  Odds Ratio 1.166 1.015 
Estimate 0.768 0.332  Estimate 0.154 0.015 
Std. Error 0.013 0.009  Std. Error 0.006 0.005 
Controls    Controls   
       
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 5,752,980  N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 5,752,980 
Persons 255,398 255,398  Persons 255,398 255,398 
       
GENDER  RACE 
 
Annual 
Earnings 
Annual Earnings 
+ Disability 
Benefits   
Annual 
Earnings 
Annual Earnings 
+ Disability 
Benefits 
       
Odds Ratio 2.449 2.629  Odds Ratio 0.983 0.923 
Estimate 0.896 0.967  Estimate -0.018 -0.080 
Std. Error 0.012 0.012  Std. Error 0.008 0.008 
Controls    Controls   
       
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 5,752,980  N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 5,752,980 
Persons 255,398 255,398  Persons 255,398 255,398 
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Table 1.8  Continued 
 
ETHNICITY       
 
Annual 
Earnings 
Annual Earnings 
+ Disability 
Benefits     
       
Odds Ratio 1.158 1.176 
    
Estimate 0.147 0.162     
Std. Error 0.021 0.021     
Controls       
       
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 5,752,980     
Persons 255,398 255,398     
Note: This table shows the odds ratio for the coefficient of interest (on the disability/gender/race/ethnicity variable) as well the associated 
estimate and standard error for each logit regression where an indicator variable for zero annual earnings/income is the dependent 
variable.  Each column is a separate regression where the column heading is the dependent variable.  Each panel is the relevant 
comparison (disability category, gender, race, or ethnicity).  Controls include gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, whether s/he has 
children, education, experience in years, the square of experience in years, industry group, occupation group, state, and year. 
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TABLE 1.9: BASELINE REGRESSION RESULTS 
         
DISABILITY (WORK LIMITATION)  DISABILITY (DIFFICULTIES) 
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings (w/o 
0's) Hourly Earnings   
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings (w/o 
0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings 
         
Disabled * UR 0.065 0.008 0.016  Disabled * UR 0.022 0.007 0.003 
Std. Error 0.014 0.003 0.006  Std. Error 0.006 0.001 0.002 
T-Stat 4.71 3.15 2.62  T-Stat 3.41 5.12 1.58 
Controls     Controls    
         
Avg. Group 
Disadvantage -1.42 -0.40 -0.22  
Avg. Group 
Disadvantage -0.32 -0.15 -0.08 
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323  N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323 
Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816  Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816 
         
GENDER  RACE 
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings (w/o 
0's) Hourly Earnings   
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings (w/o 
0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings 
         
Female * UR -0.076 -0.007 0.004  Black * UR -0.022 0.004 -0.003 
Std. Error 0.013 0.003 0.002  Std. Error 0.004 0.002 0.002 
T-Stat -5.97 -2.44 2.15  T-Stat -5.23 2.22 -1.56 
Controls     Controls    
         
Avg. Group 
Disadvantage -1.55 -0.63 -0.33  
Avg. Group 
Disadvantage -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323  N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323 
Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816  Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816 
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Table 1.9  Continued 
 
DISABILITY (WORK LIMITATION)  DISABILITY (DIFFICULTIES) 
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings (w/o 
0's) Hourly Earnings   
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings (w/o 
0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings 
      
ETHNICITY      
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings (w/o 
0's) Hourly Earnings      
         
Hispanic * UR -0.037 -0.003 -0.003      
Std. Error 0.024 0.002 0.002      
T-Stat -1.53 -1.45 -1.14      
Controls         
         
Avg. Group 
Disadvantage -0.30 -0.12 -0.14      
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323      
Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816      
                  
Note: This table shows the coefficient of interest (on the disability/gender/race/ethnicity times unemployment rate variable) as well the associated standard 
error and t-stat for each regression.  Each column is a separate regression where the column heading is the dependent variable.  Each panel is the relevant 
comparison (disability category, gender, race, or ethnicity).  Controls include gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, whether s/he has children, education, 
experience in years, the square of experience in years, industry group, occupation group, state, and year.  Average group disadvantage is expressed in log 
points. 
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The results show that for both work limiting disabilities and difficulties, the 
coefficient on the disabled*unemployment rate term is positive and significant for the 
regressions using annual earnings both with and without years of zero earnings.  This 
indicates that as the unemployment rate goes up, the gap between the disabled for each 
disability category and the non-disabled in terms of annual earnings decreases.  For 
hourly earnings, the coefficient of interest remains positive and significant for work 
limiting disabilities and for difficulties, the coefficient remains positive, but loses 
significance.  All together, the baseline results for disability point to the result that as 
the state unemployment rate increases, the gap in earnings between the disabled and 
non-disabled decreases. 
  For the demographic comparisons shown in Table 1.7, for annual earnings with 
zeros included, the gender gap seems to increase with the unemployment rate as does 
the race gap, but the ethnicity gap is insignificant though the point estimate is 
negative.  For both the gender and ethnicity gap, the results for annual earnings 
without zeros are the same as those with zeros, but, interestingly, for the black-white 
gap, including years of zero earnings results in a negative coefficient whereas not 
including years of zero earnings results in the positive and significant coefficient.   
Also, when looking at hourly earnings, the gender gap turns positive, indicating that 
when the unemployment rate increases, the gender gap in hourly earnings decreases, 
which the opposite result to that when looking at annual earnings.  The results for 
hourly earnings for both the race and the ethnicity gap are negative, but lack 
significance.  The hourly earnings sample is much smaller than the annual earnings 
sample, so losing significance for three of the comparisons is not surprising. 
 The baseline estimate for each of the detailed disability categories (ADL 
restrictions, IADL restrictions, physical impairments, mental impairments, and 
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sensory impairments) are shown in Table 1.10.  These results show that for all of the 
disability categories except mental impairments, the coefficient of interest is positive 
and significant, indicating that for each of these disability categories, the gap in annual 
earnings decreases as the local unemployment rate increases.  This is the same result 
as was seen for work limiting disabilities and difficulties in general.   Interestingly, for 
mental impairments, the coefficient of interest is negative and significant, indicating 
that the gap in annual earnings increases as local labor market conditions worsen.  
This pattern of results holds both for annual earnings with years of zero earnings 
included and for annual earnings without years of zero earnings though for mental 
impairments, the coefficient of interest is only significant at the 10% level of 
significance for the regression using annual earnings without years of zero earnings. 
The results of the threshold analysis (replace the unemployment rate in 
equations (1) and (2) with an indicator for the unemployment rate being over 6%) are 
in Table 1.11.  The results are qualitatively very similar to the results in Table 1.9, but 
the magnitudes of the coefficients are much larger as one would expect.  The major 
differences are that (1) the positive coefficient for the hourly earnings regression for 
work limiting disabilities is not significant whereas it was in Table 1.9; (2) the positive 
coefficient for hourly earnings for the gender gap also loses significance compared 
unlike in Table 1.9; and (3) the two negative coefficients for annual earnings for the 
ethnicity gap are significant here whereas they were negative, but not significant in 
Table 1.9. 
 Tables 1.12-1.14 show the results of the baseline analysis (only using annual 
earnings for sample size reasons) for each business cycle separately.18  Table 1.12  
 
                                                        
18 I combined the 1980-1981 and the 1981 to 1990 business cycles since some economists do not 
consider the two recessions in the early 1980s to be separate recessions. 
   
TABLE 1.10: BASELINE REGRESSION RESULTS (Detailed Disability Categories) 
         
WORK LIMITATION  ACTIVITIES OF DAILY LIVING RESTRICTION 
 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings   
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings 
         
Disabled * UR 0.065 0.008 0.016  Disabled * UR 0.075 0.019 -0.005 
Std. Error 0.014 0.003 0.006  Std. Error 0.010 0.002 0.007 
T-Stat 4.71 3.15 2.62  T-Stat 7.37 8.52 -0.72 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323  N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323 
Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816  Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816 
         
INSTRUM. ACTIVITIES OF DAILY LIVING 
RESTRICTION  PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT 
 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings   
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings 
         
Female * UR 0.064 0.016 0.001  Black * UR 0.021 0.010 0.001 
Std. Error 0.010 0.003 0.009  Std. Error 0.005 0.001 0.002 
T-Stat 6.10 6.23 0.16  T-Stat 4.43 9.48 0.42 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323  N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323 
Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816  Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816 
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Table 1.10 Continued 
 
   
MENTAL IMPAIRMENT  SENSORY IMPAIRMENT 
 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings   
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings 
         
Hispanic * UR -0.036 -0.003 -0.001  Black * UR 0.042 0.012 0.006 
Std. Error 0.006 0.002 0.003  Std. Error 0.007 0.002 0.003 
T-Stat -5.76 -1.90 -0.37  T-Stat 6.08 7.45 2.10 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323  N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323 
Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816  Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816 
                  
Note:  This table shows the coefficient of interest (on the disability/gender/race/ethnicity times unemployment rate variable) as well the 
associated standard error and t-stat for each regression.  Each column is a separate regression where the column heading is the 
dependent variable.  Each panel is the relevant comparison (disability category, gender, race, or ethnicity).  Controls include gender, 
race, ethnicity, marital status, whether s/he has children, education, experience in years, the square of experience in years, industry 
group, occupation group, state, and year. 
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TABLE 1.11: REGRESSION RESULTS USING INDICATOR FOR ABOVE OR BELOW 6% 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
         
DISABILITY (WORK LIMITATION)  DISABILITY (DIFFICULTIES) 
 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings   
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings 
         
Disabled * UR>6 0.318 0.022 0.037  Disabled * UR>6 0.107 0.025 0.012 
Std. Error 0.053 0.011 0.022  Std. Error 0.023 0.005 0.007 
T-Stat 5.94 1.99 1.70  T-Stat 4.72 5.46 1.79 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323  N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323 
Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816  Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816 
         
GENDER  RACE 
 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings   
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings 
         
Disabled * UR>6 -0.307 -0.040 0.008  Disabled * UR>6 -0.066 0.013 -0.011 
Std. Error 0.035 0.009 0.005  Std. Error 0.019 0.006 0.009 
T-Stat -8.82 -4.34 1.49  T-Stat -3.52 2.34 -1.32 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323  N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323 
Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816  Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816 
         
49 
   
Table 1.11 Continued 
 
      
ETHNICITY      
 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/ 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Hourly 
Earnings      
         
Disabled * UR>6 
-0.216 -0.019 -0.008      
Std. Error 0.064 0.009 0.012      
T-Stat -3.36 -2.07 -0.66      
Controls         
         
N (Person-Years) 5,752,980 4,858,504 380,323      
Persons 255,398 255,398 168,816      
                  
Note:  This table shows the coefficient of interest (on the disability/gender/race/ethnicity times unemployment rate variable) as well 
the associated standard error and t-stat for each regression.  Each column is a separate regression where the column heading is the 
dependent variable.  Each panel is the relevant comparison (disability category, gender, race, or ethnicity).  Controls include gender, 
race, ethnicity, marital status, whether s/he has children, education, experience in years, the square of experience in years, industry 
group, occupation group, state, and year. 
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covers the business cycle from 1980 to 1990, Table 1.13 covers 1990 to 2001, and 
Table 1.14 covers 2001 to 2007.  Since macroeconomists have generally found that 
these business cycles were very different in nature in terms of the roots of the 
recessions and which segments of the labor force were most affected by the 
contractions and expansions (Blanchard and Stock, 1986; Stock and Watson, 1996), it 
would make sense the results shown above might depend on which business cycle is 
being considered.   
Since restricting the number of years cuts the sample size down considerably, 
many of the coefficients do naturally lose significance.  The results do show that there 
is a good deal of variance across the business cycles though.  For example, for annual 
earnings with zeros included, for work limiting disabilities, the coefficient of interest 
is negative for 2001 to 2007, but positive for 1990 to 2001.  Without years of zero 
earnings, the above coefficient is positive for 1980 to 1991 and negative for 1991 to 
2001.  For difficulties, for annual earnings with years of zero earnings, the coefficient 
is positive for 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 2001 (though marginally significant), but 
negative for 2001 and 2007.  Also, for the gender comparison, for annual earnings 
without zeros included, the coefficient is negative for 1980 to 1990, negative though 
insignificant for1990 to 2001, and positive and significant for 2001 to 2007. 
In each of Tables 1.12 – 1.14, in the third column of each panel, I also show 
the results of regressions estimated on samples that only included those who were in 
the labor force for the entire period and whose disability status did not change.  For the 
1980-1990 results, this column looks similar to the column without years of zero 
earnings though the coefficients are smaller for the disability and gender comparisons.  
For the 1990-2001 results, the disability comparisons look different from those for the 
previous business cycle.  Here, while the estimates are positive for the first and third  
 
   
TABLE 1.12: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1980-1990 
         
DISABILITY (WORK LIMITATION)  DISABILITY (DIFFICULTIES) 
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample)   
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample) 
         
Disabled * UR 0.012 0.015 0.009  Disabled * UR 0.017 0.010 0.004 
Std. Error 0.009 0.004 0.004  Std. Error 0.006 0.002 0.002 
T-Stat 1.36 3.90 2.32  T-Stat 3.08 6.32 2.43 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 1,619,412 1,353,557 705,133  N (Person-Years) 1,619,412 1,353,557 705,133 
Persons 181,733 174,159 64,103  Persons 181,733 174,159 64,103 
         
GENDER  RACE 
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample)   
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample) 
         
Female * UR -0.112 -0.014 -0.011  Black * UR -0.012 0.003 0.000 
Std. Error 0.007 0.002 0.002  Std. Error 0.007 0.002 0.003 
T-Stat -15.75 -7.26 -6.68  T-Stat -1.79 1.31 0.12 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 1,619,412 1,353,557 705,133  N (Person-Years) 1,619,412 1,353,557 705,133 
Persons 181,733 174,159 64,103  Persons 181,733 174,159 64,103 
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Table 1.12 Continued 
 
      
ETHNICITY      
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample)      
         
Hispanic * UR -0.055 0.000 -0.002      
Std. Error 0.019 0.004 0.004      
T-Stat -2.96 -0.03 -0.54      
Controls         
         
N (Person-Years) 1,619,412 1,353,557 705,133      
Persons 181,733 174,159 64,103      
                  
Note:  This table shows the coefficient of interest (on the disability/gender/race/ethnicity times unemployment rate variable) as well the associated 
standard error and t-stat for each regression.  Each column is a separate regression where the column heading is the dependent variable.  The last 
column only includes those who have positive earnings for the entire period and do not change disability status.  Each panel is the relevant 
comparison (disability category, gender, race, or ethnicity).  Controls include gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, whether s/he has children, 
education, experience in years, the square of experience in years, industry group, occupation group, state, and year. 
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TABLE 1.13: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1990-2001 
         
DISABILITY (WORK LIMITATION)  DISABILITY (DIFFICULTIES) 
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample)   
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample) 
         
Disabled * UR 0.141 -0.012 0.013  Disabled * UR 0.011 0.000 0.006 
Std. Error 0.014 0.004 0.006  Std. Error 0.006 0.002 0.002 
T-Stat 10.25 -2.67 2.27  T-Stat 1.84 0.15 3.11 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 2,303,818 1,983,712 1,164,600  N (Person-Years) 2,303,818 1,983,712 1,164,600 
Persons 227,463 219,118 97,050  Persons 227,463 219,118 97,050 
         
GENDER  RACE 
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample)   
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample) 
         
Female * UR -0.082 -0.003 -0.001  Black * UR -0.068 0.005 0.007 
Std. Error 0.007 0.003 0.003  Std. Error 0.009 0.003 0.003 
T-Stat -11.29 -1.23 -0.49  T-Stat -7.69 1.95 2.19 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 2,303,818 1,983,712 1,164,600  N (Person-Years) 2,303,818 1,983,712 1,164,600 
Persons 227,463 219,118 97,050  Persons 227,463 219,118 97,050 
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Table 1.13 Continued 
 
      
ETHNICITY      
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample)      
         
Hispanic * UR -0.065 -0.011 -0.016      
Std. Error 0.018 0.003 0.003      
T-Stat -3.64 -3.33 -4.84      
Controls         
         
N (Person-Years) 2,303,818 1,983,712 1,164,600      
Persons 227,463 219,118 97,050      
                  
Note:  This table shows the coefficient of interest (on the disability/gender/race/ethnicity times unemployment rate variable) as well the associated 
standard error and t-stat for each regression.  Each column is a separate regression where the column heading is the dependent variable.  The last 
column only includes those who have positive earnings for the entire period and do not change disability status.  Each panel is the relevant 
comparison (disability category, gender, race, or ethnicity).  Controls include gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, whether s/he has children, 
education, experience in years, the square of experience in years, industry group, occupation group, state, and year. 
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TABLE 1.14: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 2001-2007 
         
DISABILITY (WORK LIMITATION)  DISABILITY (DIFFICULTIES) 
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample)   
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample) 
         
Disabled * UR -0.084 0.001 -0.004  Disabled * UR -0.038 -0.003 -0.002 
Std. Error 0.035 0.015 0.018  Std. Error 0.014 0.004 0.003 
T-Stat -2.39 0.08 -0.19  T-Stat -2.63 -0.76 -0.62 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 1,413,619 1,198,911 920,283  N (Person-Years) 1,413,619 1,198,911 920,283 
Persons 219,087 202,903 131,469  Persons 219,087 202,903 131,469 
         
GENDER  RACE 
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample)   
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample) 
         
Female * UR -0.018 0.011 0.014  Black * UR -0.002 -0.004 0.005 
Std. Error 0.008 0.004 0.004  Std. Error 0.015 0.004 0.005 
T-Stat -2.19 2.81 3.42  T-Stat -0.17 -0.79 1.02 
Controls     Controls    
         
N (Person-Years) 1,413,619 1,198,911 920,283  N (Person-Years) 1,413,619 1,198,911 920,283 
Persons 219,087 202,903 131,469  Persons 219,087 202,903 131,469 
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Table 1.14 Continued 
 
      
ETHNICITY      
 
Annual 
Earnings (w/ 
0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(w/o 0's) 
Annual 
Earnings 
(constant 
sample)      
         
Hispanic * UR 0.017 -0.006 -0.011      
Std. Error 0.013 0.007 0.008      
T-Stat 1.33 -0.88 -1.42      
Controls         
         
N (Person-Years) 1,413,619 1,198,911 920,283      
Persons 219,087 202,903 131,469      
Note:  This table shows the coefficient of interest (on the disability/gender/race/ethnicity times unemployment rate variable) as well the 
associated standard error and t-stat for each regression.  Each column is a separate regression where the column heading is the dependent 
variable.  The last column only includes those who have positive earnings for the entire period and do not change disability status.  Each panel is 
the relevant comparison (disability category, gender, race, or ethnicity).  Controls include gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, whether s/he has 
children, education, experience in years, the square of experience in years, industry group, occupation group, state, and year. 
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column, they are negative for the second column for work limiting disabilities and 
insignificant for difficulties.  This is likely related to previous research, which has 
shown that the 1990s was a time where there were large changes in the labor market 
outcomes of the disabled and the disability insurance rolls increased dramatically.  For 
2001-2007, the results in the third column also do not too drastically different from 
those in the second column.  However, for the disability comparisons, the estimates in 
the first column are now negative whereas they were positive for the previous two 
business cycles.  Also, the estimates are insignificant for the second and third columns 
whereas the estimates in the third column were positive for the other two business 
cycles. 
These variations are summed up and more clearly seen in the Chart 1.13, a bar 
chart that shows the coefficient of interest as it changes over time for each regression 
in each category of comparison.  Standard error bars are also included to gauge the 
significance of each coefficient.  Looking at this chart, it is clear that these effects vary 
from business cycle to business cycle. 
Robustness checks were done on the baseline results.  These included 
estimating regressions with leads and lags of the unemployment rate, using SIPP 
provided weights, using just the DER or the SER variables for the measure of annual 
earnings, excluding observations where the SSA data indicated that the person was 
receiving disability insurance payments, applying a best guess for the disability start 
date for the detailed disability categories, using the state-level employment to 
population ratio instead of the unemployment rate, and excluding years after an 
individual in the SIPP from analysis.  None of these resulted in estimates that were 
qualitatively different from those shown in Table 1.9.  
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CHART 1.13: BUSINESS CYCLE RESULTS 
 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 This study is the first to study how earnings and wage gaps change over the 
course of the business cycle for people with different types of disabilities, and for 
women, blacks, and Hispanics. While the levels of these demographic earnings gaps 
and the economic disadvantage faced by those with disabilities has been explored in 
numerous studies and the trends in these levels has also been explored in depth, the 
cyclicality of these gaps has been studied to a much lesser extent. Building upon 
Biddle and Hamermesh (2012), I explore how the gaps in annual and hourly earnings 
between the non-disabled and the disabled, men and women, whites and blacks, and 
whites and Hispanics changes as the state unemployment rate changes. 
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Economic theory does not have a clear prediction for whether these earnings 
gaps should increase as the unemployment rate increases or decreases. An increased 
ability for employers to discriminate during economic downturns would predict larger 
earnings gaps as labor market conditions worsen, but self selection among the more 
“vulnerable”  groups  (women,  blacks,  Hispanics,  and  the  disabled)  into  more  stable  
industries and occupations would predict smaller earnings gaps at higher 
unemployment rates. Compositional shifts after labor market conditions worsen could 
affect the results in either direction.  This invites an empirical investigation of the 
question and I use a unique restricted access linked data set to look into this. 
My results show that for annual earnings, the disabled seem to fare better than 
their counterparts as local labor market conditions worsen.  For an increase in the 
unemployment rate of 3.7 percentage points (the average increase in the national 
unemployment rate from peak to trough during the recessions from 1978 to 2010), the 
results indicate that gap in annual earnings between those with work limiting 
disabilities and those without would shrink by 24 percentage points (3 percentage 
points without years of zero earnings included).  For the earnings gap between those 
with difficulties and those without, the gap would shrink by 8 percentage points (3 
percentage points without years of zero earnings).   
On the other hand, women seem to fare worse than men.  An increase in the 
unemployment rate of 3.7 percentage points would translate into an increase in the gap 
in annual earnings of 28 percentage points (2.6 percentage points with years of zero 
earnings excluded).  Blacks seem to do relatively worse when considering both the 
intensive and extensive margin (3.7 percentage point increase in unemployment rate 
would mean 8 percentage point increase in annual earnings gap), but slightly better 
when only considering the intensive margin (same change in unemployment rate 
would result in 1.5 percentage point decrease in annual earnings gap).  The results are 
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largely inconclusive for Hispanics, but evidence from the threshold analysis suggests 
that they fare relatively worse in recessions.  In comparison, Biddle and Hamermesh 
(2012), looking at weekly earnings, finds that increases in the unemployment rate lead 
to an increase in the gender gap, a decrease in the race gap, and a small increase in the 
ethnicity gap. 
For hourly earnings, many of the estimates lose statistical significance due to 
sample size, but there is evidence that the disabled still fare relatively better in 
recessions (gap in hourly earnings would shrink by 6 percentage points for a increase 
in the unemployment rate of 3.7 percentage points for work limiting disabilities), as do 
women (same change in unemployment rate means gender gap in hourly earnings 
decreases by 1.5 percentage points), but the race and ethnicity gaps increase. My 
results also show that these effects change depending on which business cycle is being 
considered. 
It is important to remember, when interpreting the results, however, that, as 
with all studies of earnings and wage gaps, we do not observe the marginal product of 
labor and thus cannot ascribe a cause to the patterns of earnings gaps across the 
business cycle.  For example, with the disability gap, we do not and cannot know in 
this study whether taste-based discrimination (or for that matter, a taste for fairness 
among employers) changes as labor market conditions change or if the pattern of 
results we see is caused by differential selection into different types of jobs or if the 
changes in the composition of the disabled population over the business cycle is 
driving the results or if the main cause is something else entirely.  The same applies 
for the gender, race, and ethnicity earnings gaps as well. 
This study has several advantages compared to previous studies, including the 
fact that I can follow people over a long period of time (1978 to 2010), the larger 
sample size from pooling nine panels of the SIPP, and that the detailed information on 
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disability in the SIPP allows me to look at a more complete disabled population 
beyond just those who describe themselves as having a work limiting disability. 
There are also several limitations, including the lack of hourly income 
variables for the years that people are not in the SIPP, the fact that I do not have state 
of residence, real time reports of disability, and other background information for 
people when they are not in the SIPP, and the fact that disability is self-reported in the 
SIPP.  Further analysis using other datasets would be useful to determine if these 
results are affected by the assumptions I make due to data constraints. 
This study is among the first to estimate the cyclicality of the disability, 
gender, race, and ethnicity wage and earnings gaps.  It provides evidence that earnings 
gaps do vary over the business cycle and that the disability, gender, race, and ethnicity 
gaps are affected in different ways by local labor market conditions.  Naturally, it 
invites further investigation of these and related issues.  Foremost among these is the 
mechanism behind the effects and why these wage and earnings gaps are affectedly 
differently by labor market conditions.  Without additional research, it is impossible to 
know how to interpret the results from this study and whether the changing wage and 
earnings gaps come from employer-based discrimination, compositional shifts, 
workers’  preferences,  or  something  else  entirely.  
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APPENDIX TABLE A1: BASELINE REGRESSION RESULTS WITH MORE DETAILED COEFFICIENTS  
               
DISABILITY (WORK LIMITATION)  DISABILITY (DIFFICULTIES)       
 
Co-efficient Std. Error T Stat 
  
Co-efficient Std. Error T Stat 
 
   
  
Annual Earnings (w/ 0's) Annual Earnings (w/ 0's)      
Disabled -1.8149 0.084 -21.50  Disabled -0.4552 0.038 -12.08       
UR -0.0440 0.004 -11.41  UR -0.0452 0.004 -11.86       
Disabled * UR 0.0650 0.014 4.71  Disabled * UR 0.0218 0.006 3.41       
Controls     Controls          
Person-Years 5,752,980    Person-Years 5,752,980         
Persons 255,398    Persons 255,398         
Annual Earnings (w/o 0's)  Annual Earnings (w/o 0's)       
Disabled -0.4479 0.016 -27.65  Disabled -0.1891 0.008 -24.08       
UR -0.0105 0.001 -7.37  UR -0.0111 0.001 -7.96       
Disabled * UR 0.0080 0.003 3.15  Disabled * UR 0.0068 0.001 5.12       
Controls     Controls          
Person-Years 4,858,504    Person-Years 4,858,504         
Persons 255,398    Persons 255,398         
Hourly Earnings  Hourly Earnings       
Disabled -0.3116 0.044 -7.14  Disabled -0.0981 0.010 -9.52       
UR -0.0009 0.002 -0.47  UR -0.0008 0.002 -0.41       
Disabled * UR 0.0160 0.006 2.62  Disabled * UR 0.0026 0.002 1.58       
Controls     Controls          
Person-Years 380,323    Person-Years 380,323         
Persons 168,816    Persons 168,816         
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Table A.1 Continued 
 
DISABILITY (WORK LIMITATION)  DISABILITY (DIFFICULTIES)       
GENDER  RACE  ETHNICITY  
 
Co-efficient Std. Error T Stat 
  
Co-efficient Std. Error T Stat 
  
Co-efficient Std. Error T Stat 
 
Annual Earnings (w/ 0's) Annual Earnings (w/ 0's) Annual Earnings (w/ 0's) 
Female -1.0973 0.070 -15.67  Black 0.0686 0.026 2.66  Hispanic -0.0839 0.144 -0.58  
UR -0.0031 0.008 -0.39  UR -0.0404 0.004 -10.62  UR -0.0404 0.004 -10.43  
Female * UR -0.0759 0.013 -5.97  Black * UR -0.0217 0.004 -5.23  Hispanic * UR -0.0367 0.024 -1.53  
Controls     Controls     Controls     
Person-Years 5,752,980    Person-Years 5,752,980    Person-Years 5,752,980    
Persons 255,398    Persons 255,398    Persons 255,398    
Annual Earnings (w/o 0's)  Annual Earnings (w/o 0's)  Annual Earnings (w/o 0's)  
Female -0.5860 0.017 -35.11  Black -0.1219 0.010 -12.66  Hispanic -0.1023 0.014 -7.08  
UR -0.0069 0.002 -3.05  UR -0.0107 0.001 -7.65  UR -0.0101 0.001 -7.05  
Female * UR -0.0072 0.003 -2.44  Black * UR 0.0036 0.002 2.22  Hispanic * UR -0.0034 0.002 -1.45  
Controls     Controls     Controls     
Person-Years 4,858,504    Person-Years 4,858,504    Person-Years 4,858,504    
Persons 255,398    Persons 255,398    Persons 255,398    
Hourly Earnings  Hourly Earnings  Hourly Earnings  
Female -0.3489 0.010 
-
35.26  Black -0.0632 0.014 -4.38  Hispanic -0.1241 0.017 -7.11  
UR -0.0021 0.002 -1.07  UR 0.0000 0.002 0.00  UR -0.0001 0.002 -0.06  
Female * UR 0.0035 0.002 2.15  Black * UR -0.0034 0.002 -1.56  Hispanic * UR -0.0027 0.002 -1.14  
Controls     Controls     Controls     
Person-Years 380,323    Person-Years 380,323    Person-Years 380,323    
Persons 168,816    Persons 168,816    Persons 168,816    
                             
Note: This table shows the results from the same regressions as Table 1.9, but includes more of the estimated coefficients.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
IS THE GENDER COMPENSATION GAP 
SMALLER THAN THE GENDER WAGE GAP? 
 
Chen Zhao19 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
One of the explanations sometimes put forth to account for the observed 
gender gap in wages is that men and women value the nonwage aspects of a job 
differently.  An example is nonwage benefits, which account for about 30 percent of 
total compensation.  If women value nonwage benefits relatively more than men do 
and there exists a tradeoff between nonwage benefits and wages (as research shows), 
then the observed gender wage gap would be larger than the gender gap in total 
compensation.  In this paper, I make the first attempt in the economics literature to 
construct two individual level measures of total compensation in dollar terms – one 
using supplemental CPS data on employer contribution to health insurance premiums 
and one using the NLSY linked to employer cost data.  The second assumes that the 
value of nonwage benefits is the industry-and-occupation or the industry-and-firm-size 
specific  cost  of  providing  them.    “Total  compensation”  is  then  the  sum  of  wages  plus  
contribution towards health insurance premiums for the first measure and the sum of 
wages plus the cost of benefits an employee is offered for the second measure.  I find 
that the observed gender gap resulting from these measures of total compensation is 
almost identical to the observed gender gap in wages, providing evidence against the                                                         
19 Cornell University, Department of Economics, Ithaca, NY 14853. Email: cz92@cornell.edu  I am 
grateful to John Abowd, Francine Blau, John Cawley, Shooshan Danagoulian, Kevin Hallock, Michael 
Strain, and Douglas Webber for their many helpful comments on and advice with this project. 
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idea that the differential valuation of nonwage benefits accounts for some portion of 
the gender wage gap. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The existence of the gender wage gap is well documented in the labor 
economics  literature.    Altonji  and  Blank’s  1999  Handbook of Labor Economics 
chapter documents a wage gap in 1995 of about 0.2 log points after controlling for 
education, experience, industry, occupation, AFQT score, and other demographic 
characteristics.  They describe  the  gap  as  “stubbornly  persistent.”    The  economics 
literature has considered several potential sources of the gender wage gap.  Two are 
discussed in Altonji and Blank (1999) -- a difference in human capital accumulation 
and statistical discrimination.  Two others are discussed in Bertrand (2010) -- 
psychological and attitude differences between men and women that may make some 
jobs more or less attractive to one gender and the existence of social norms that make 
some  jobs  more  or  less  socially  “appropriate”  for  women  to  do.     
Some strands of the literature consider yet another source of the gender wage 
gap.  These studies model each job as a bundle of characteristics that include the 
offered wage, working conditions, job security, and nonwage benefits.  Workers 
choose whether to accept jobs after taking into consideration all the characteristics 
(Filer, 1985).  The focus of this paper is on nonwage benefits.  Even if we ignore and 
strip away all the other characteristics of a job that may matter to a worker when 
deciding whether to accept a job, any measure of compensation that does not include 
nonwage benefits in addition to wages is incomplete. 
Almost all of the existing literature on the gender wage gap uses just wages as 
the dependent variable.  Wages, however, only account for about 70 to 75 percent of 
total compensation costs for most of the past four decades, according to Bureau of 
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Labor Statistics’ Employer Costs of Employee Compensation data.  With the recent 
increase in the cost of health insurance, the proportion of total compensation that is in 
the form of nonwage benefits has only been increasing and could reasonably be 
expected to increase more in the future.  With this in mind, nonwage benefits are 
obviously an important omission and, starting with Duncan (1976), the potential 
importance of nonwage benefits to the wage equations that labor economists estimate 
has been recognized. 
Determining  the  “value”  of  total  compensation,  however,  is  naturally a 
difficult exercise.  First, there is no obviously correct concept of how the value of 
nonwage benefits should be measured.  Is the value that we are interested in the cost to 
employers of providing the benefits, the cost workers would incur to provide it for 
themselves if their employers did not provide the benefits, or is it some intrinsic utility 
that the worker receives from enjoying the benefit?  This difficulty in valuing the 
benefits is also heterogeneous across different benefits, i.e. health insurance is easier 
to value than flexible hours.  In this study, I use the cost to employers of providing the 
benefits.  Though it may not be the way many would ideally want to measure the value 
of nonwage benefits, I argue that it is at least one way of measuring the value we are 
interested in and could be thought of as an approximation of what we are really 
interested in. 
The other difficulty that explains why there are no individual-level datasets 
that provide valuations in dollar terms of nonwage benefits is that, for at least some 
benefits, people are often unaware of even whether they have access to the benefit at 
their jobs, not to mention the cost of providing these benefits, how much it would cost 
them  to  provide  the  benefits  for  themselves,  or  how  much  they  “value”  it. 
The difficulty with finding appropriate data almost certainly explains why so 
few papers looking at the gender wage gap (or any other topic in labor economics, for 
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that matter) have attempted to take into account total compensation rather than simply 
wages.  There is evidence from the literature, however, to suggest that the gender gap 
in total compensation is smaller than the gender wage gap.  Levy (2006) shows that 
there is a difference between the gender gap in access to own employer health 
insurance coverage and the gender wage gap.  Using the Current Population Survey, 
she finds that, for the period 1980 to 2000, the male-female health insurance gap and 
the black-white health insurance gap are both smaller than the respective wage gaps.  
This suggests that measuring compensation as wages plus health insurance would 
result in a smaller compensation gap for men versus women and blacks versus whites 
than simply using wages.   
In addition, some research indicates that some or all of the cost of the 
employer’s  contribution  to  health  insurance  is  passed  on  to  employees  in  the form of 
lower wages.  Olson (2002) finds that wives with own employer health insurance 
coverage accept jobs with wages that are 0.2 log points lower.  Gruber (1994) uses an 
exogenous shift in the cost of covering women of childbearing age to show that the 
full cost of health insurance is shifted to workers in the form of lower wages.  And 
lastly, Baicker and Chandra (2006) estimate that a 10 percent increase in health 
insurance premiums is associated with a 2.3 percent decrease in wages.  This literature 
indicates that, for health insurance at least, there is tradeoff between wages and access 
to the benefit. 
For  other  benefits  that  may  be  considered  “family  friendly”  benefits,  such  as  
flexible hours, child care at work, more vacation/sick days, it is natural to suppose that 
women value these benefits more than men do and may select into jobs where they 
have access to these benefits even if the cost is lower wages. 
The literature on compensation gaps is sparse, at best.  Solberg and Laughlin 
(1995) use the 1991 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which has 
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data on whether individuals have access to certain benefits at the jobs, to create an 
index of total compensation using canonical correlation analysis.  They conduct their 
analysis by occupation group and find a significant gender wage gap in six of seven 
occupational  categories,  but  a  significant  “compensation”  gap  in  only  one  of  the  seven  
occupational categories.  They interpret this as evidence that a gender gap in total 
compensation would be smaller than the gender wage gap.  However, it may be the 
case that simply looking at the statistical significance of their estimates is not the 
correct way to interpret their results and it is difficult to compare the point estimates of 
the coefficients of interest since their compensation index is not in dollar terms.  
In contrast to the results in Solberg and Laughlin (1995), Lowen and Sicilian 
(2009), also using the NLSY, finds that while women are more likely to receive what 
they term “family-friendly”  benefits,  they  are  not  more  likely  to  receive  other  benefits.    
They also find no evidence that including access to benefits as independent variables 
changes the coefficient on the gender dummy variable in a wage regression.  They 
interpret this as evidence that the gender wage gap would not be smaller than a gender 
gap in compensation. 
In a study looking at the related black-white wage and compensation gaps, 
Lepping (2007), using the NLSY, calculates total compensation as the weighted 
average of wages and the number of fringe benefits received.  Here, while the wage 
gap is found to be significant, the compensation gap is not and this is interpreted as 
evidence that the black-white compensation gap is smaller than the black-white wage 
gap. 
To actually answer the question of what would happen to the gender wage gap 
if total compensation is used in place of wages, one would ideally like to simply do 
just that -- redo the analysis done in the gender wage gap literature with a different 
dependent variable.  In this paper, I attempt to use that approach by constructing two 
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measures of total compensation using different methods.  First I use the Current 
Population Survey to construct a measure of compensation that is simply wages plus 
employers’  contribution to health insurance.  While this is far from ideal and fails to 
take into account the myriad of other nonwage benefits, it does account for one of the 
costliest components of nonwage benefits for employers.  This can be thought of as a 
first step toward answering the question of what would happen to the gender wage gap 
if the cost of nonwage benefits were included. 
Second, I use data on employers, the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics’  Employer  
Costs of Employee Compensation dataset, in conjunction with individual level data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.  I link the industry and occupation as 
well as industry and firm size specific costs of providing nonwage benefits to 
individual level data on access to these nonwage benefits in order to place a value on 
the benefits that is equal to the cost of providing them. 
I then re-estimate the standard gender wage gap equations using my two 
constructed measures of compensation and find that there is no difference between the 
gender gap in total compensation and the gender wage gap.  While these two measures 
are far from perfect, these results do provide evidence that differential valuation of 
nonwage benefits by men and women may not account for any portion of the observed 
gender wage gap. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: second two details the various data 
sources I used, section three explains the methods I used to link the data sources and 
do the analysis, section four contains the results, and section five concludes. 
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2. DATA 
2.1 Current Population Survey 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a largely cross-sectional monthly 
survey conducted by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics to assess 
the employment situation and is commonly used in gender wage gap papers.  The CPS 
started in 1940 and surveys about 60,000 households (120,000 individuals) chosen 
from the civilian non-institutional population each month.  Households are in the CPS 
for a total of eight months (four months continuously in, eight months out, and four 
months in) so short panels can be formed by linking households from month to month.  
The CPS contains labor market information for each member of household in the 
outgoing rotation group 15 years of age or older in the calendar week containing 12th 
day of the month.  The CPS also conducts special supplements certain months 
collecting additional data based on certain topics.  The most regular supplement is the 
March Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) that includes data on income 
received in the previous calendar year and health insurance coverage.  Since the mid 
1980’s  the  BLS  has  also  been  conducting  an  Occupational  Mobility  and  Job  Tenure  
Supplement in January or February. 
As my first measure of compensation, I use the 1995 and 2005 February and 
March Current Population Surveys.  I chose 2005 both because I wanted this section to 
be comparable to the later analysis I do with the 2006 and 2008 National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth and 2006 and 2008 Employer Costs of Employee Compensation data 
and because 2005 is the most recent Occupational Mobility and Job Tenure 
Supplement to have been conducted in February (linking from February to March 
allows for a larger linked sample than linking January to March).  1995 was chosen as 
robustness check to make sure that the results are not unique to just one year of data.
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I use both the February and March Supplements because the March 
supplement has labor market information, whether one has own employer health 
insurance coverage, and how much  one’s  employer  contributes  toward  health  
insurance premiums, but not whether one is eligible for own employer health 
insurance coverage.  Using just the March supplement would not allow me to identify 
those who were offered health insurance by their employers, but declined to take it up.  
The February supplement, however, does have a question on whether one is offered 
health  insurance  from  one’s  employer,  which  allows  me  to  identify  everyone  who  is  
eligible for health insurance from his/her employers.  Taking advantage of the quasi-
panel nature of the CPS, I link the two supplements together (described in section 
three) for my analysis. 
 
2.2 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79 (NLSY79) is a panel survey of 
individuals born between the years 1957 and 1964.  From 1979 to 1994, these 
individuals were interviewed annually and since 1994, they have been interviewed 
biannually.  Originally, there were 12,686 individuals, aged 14-22 years, in the survey 
in 1979.  Over time however, there has been much attrition and only about 7,000 were 
interviewed in 2006 and 2008. The NLSY has also commonly been used in gender 
wage gap studies since it allows researchers to control for many variables not found in 
the CPS, including the AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) score, which is often 
used as a proxy for ability (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Rodgers and Spriggs, 1996; 
Strain, 2011). 
Apart from a large number of demographic and family background variables 
and labor market information, the NLSY79 also includes a variable that indicates 
whether the individual is offered the following benefits at each job s/he currently 
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holds: health insurance, life insurance, dental insurance, retirement, sick days, 
vacation days, maternity leave, profit sharing, training, flexible hours, and child care.  
I use these variables on access to nonwage benefits in conjunction with data on the 
cost of offering nonwage benefits from the Employer Costs for Employee 
Compensation data to create a second measure on the value of total compensation.  
 
2.3 Employer Costs of Employee Compensation Data 
The Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) is a dataset 
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and is derived from the National 
Compensation Survey (NCS), a quarterly survey of approximately 4,000 employers 
(employing about 14 million workers) in the US.  The dataset starts in 1986 and 
covers both private and state/local government.  The ECEC reports, by industry, 
occupation, firm size, region and union status, the cost to employers in dollars per 
hour of wages and salaries as well as various nonwage benefits (aggregated at 
different levels in different extracts of the data).  These benefits include paid leave, 
supplemental pay, insurance, retirement, and legally required benefits. 
For the years 2006 to 2011, the BLS publishes supplemental tables that 
provide the same benefit cost data but reported by the following cross tabulations: 
industry and occupation as well as industry and firm size.  These are the measures of 
nonwage benefit costs that I will link to the NLSY data on individual access to 
nonwage benefits by industry and occupation as well as industry and firm size. 
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3. METHODS 
3.1 Data Linkages 
3.1.1 Linking the February and March CPS Data Sets 
Because of the quasi-panel nature of the CPS, I was able to link the February 
and March supplements for 2005 and 1995.  Households in the CPS are interviewed 
for four consecutive months, then not interviewed for eight consecutive months, and 
then interviewed again for another four consecutive months for a total of eight months 
that they are in the survey.  So, for example, if a household is interviewed from 
January to April of 2005, then it would be interviewed again from January to April of 
2006, but it would not be in the May to December 2005 CPS datasets.  When a 
household is in month four or month eight (April 2005 and April 2008 in the 
example), they are in the so-called  “Outgoing  Rotation  Group.” 
With this structure, in theory, 75 percent of the households in the February and 
March supplements could be linked.  This figure is less than 100 percent because those 
in month four or month eight of the interview cycle in the February supplement would 
not be in the March supplement and those in month one or month five of the interview 
cycle in the March supplement would not be in the February supplement.  Only those 
in months one through seven in the February supplement and therefore, in months two 
through eight in the March supplement could potentially be in my sample. 
Ideally, person level identifiers would be used to link the two supplements.  In 
reality, since the CPS public use datasets do not contain person level identifiers, I 
linked individuals in the two supplements by household identifier, month in sample, 
person line number, family number, state, sex, and race.  Those observations that were 
found to be duplicates based on the above variables were dropped. 
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3.1.2 Linking the NLSY to the ECEC 
I created two linkages between the NLSY and the ECEC: first, by industry and 
occupation specific cells and second, by industry and firm size specific cells.  
Unfortunately, the NLSY and the ECEC do not use the same codes for industry and 
occupation.  While the ECEC uses Census codes for both industry and occupation, the 
NLSY uses NAICS (North American Industry Classification) codes and SOC 
(Standard Occupational Classification) codes.  I used published crosswalks to 
harmonize the two sets of industry and occupation classification systems.20  Due to 
confidentiality concerns, the ECEC data is only cross-tabulated at the two digit 
industry and occupation level. 
To create the first linkage, I first put all individuals in the NLSY into industry 
and occupation specific cells.  Then, for each benefit the individual has access to at 
their  primary  job  (Job  #1  in  the  NLSY,  also  known  as  the  “CPS  job”),  I  code  the  value  
of the benefit as the average industry and occupation specific cost to employers of 
providing the benefit according to the ECEC data.  To create the second linkage using 
industry and firm size rather than industry and occupation, I followed basically the 
same procedure as above.  First, I placed all individuals from the NLSY into industry 
and firm size category cells and assigned each individual, for each benefit available to 
him, the average industry and firm size specific cost to employers of providing the 
benefit using the ECEC data. 
It is important to note that I was not able to use as many individuals in the 
NLSY as I would have liked due to the fact that I was using published public-use cross 
tabulations of the ECEC data.  Some of the industry by occupation cells or industry by 
firm size category cells in the ECEC were so small that the BLS could not publish 
                                                        
20 The Census Bureau maintains crosswalks between these industry and occupations codes.  See: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www//ioindex/crosswalks.html 
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them without risk to confidentiality protection, so only a subset of the cells are 
published.  I used two methods to deal with this issue.  First, I simply dropped those 
individuals in the NLSY belonging to industry and occupation cells that I did not have 
cost data for from the analysis.  As a second method, I used multiple imputation to 
impute the cost data for the industry/occupation and industry/firm size cells that I did 
not have data for. 
Multiple imputation is an alternative to mean imputation and conditional mean 
imputation, which produce too many cases at the mean, produce estimates that are 
biased, and, mostly importantly, reduces variance because the imputed values contain 
no error.  Standard analysis using singly imputed values will overstate the significance 
of the parameter estimates since the standard errors will be too small.  In contrast, 
multiple imputation is done by drawing multiple values from a distribution, meaning 
the imputed values inherently contain some variance.  Analysis is done separately on 
each  “completed”  dataset  with  each imputed value and the separate estimates are 
pooled to generate a single set of results.  The final parameter estimate is simply the 
mean of all the parameter estimates obtained from each imputation. The final multiple 
imputation estimate of the standard error is the square root of the sum of the within 
imputation variance (the average of the variance across the imputations) and the 
between imputation variance (a function of the variance of the parameter estimate 
across the imputed datasets and the number of imputations). By using all of the results 
across the imputations, multiple imputation accounts for the uncertainty in the imputed 
values (Meng, 1995; Rubin, 1996; Little and Rubin, 2002; Graham, et al. 2007). 
For this study, I imputed the cost of each of the benefits for the industry/ 
occupation and the industry/firm size cells that were suppressed in the ECEC data.  
The variables used in my imputation model are: hourly wage, race, ethnicity, 
education, potential experience, region, SMSA status, industry group, occupation 
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group, establishment size, marital status, whether the individual has children, and 
union status.  These include all the variables in the regression equations I estimate in 
my analysis.  Since the missingness pattern in my data was not monotonic, I used both 
the multivariate normal model (drawing from a multivariate normal distribution of all 
the variables in the imputation model) and the chained equations approach (generates 
imputations by performing a series of univariate regressions).  As results from the two 
approaches were very similar, I only show results from the chained equations 
approach.  The results shown are also estimated using ten implicates for the imputed 
variables.  Results using five, twenty, and fifty implicates were qualitatively identical. 
Another data issue is that, in terms of firm size categories for the industry by 
firm size category cross tabulation, the BLS designed the coarseness of the firm size 
categories for each industry so as to not run into small cell issues.  This means that 
while for some industries, firm size categories were 1-49, 50-100, 100-199, 200-499, 
and 500+, for other industries, some of these had to be combined, making for coarser 
cells. 
Lastly, the NLSY also did not use the same benefit categories as the ECEC 
uses for its cross tabulations.  The benefit categories are shown in Table 2.1.  I 
assigned individuals who had access to medical insurance, dental insurance, and life 
insurance the cell specific cost of providing insurance in the ECEC and I assigned 
individuals who had access to vacation days, sick days, and maternity leave the cell 
specific cost of providing paid leave.  There was a high of degree of correlation 
between having access to one type of insurance and another and having one type of 
paid leave and another.  I also ran the analysis only requiring individuals to have 
access to have one type of insurance or one type of paid leave to be assigned the cost 
of insurance or paid leave and found that it did not make a difference to the main 
results.  
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TABLE 2.1: BENEFIT CATEGORY LINKAGES 
  
Employer Costs for Employee 
Benefits 
National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 
Insurance 
Medical Insurance 
Dental Insurance 
Life Insurance 
Paid Leave 
Vacation Days 
Sick Leave 
Maternity Leave 
Retirement Retirement 
Supplemental Pay Profit Sharing 
  
 
3.2 Analysis 
3.2.1 CPS Analysis 
For the purpose of analysis, I dropped those individuals who, at the time of the 
survey, were in school or the army, those who were not employed and working full 
time for the whole year, and those who were working for the government.   I also, 
dropped the top and bottom two percent of the wage distribution. 
There are two measures of hourly wage in the CPS.  Everyone in the Outgoing 
Rotation Group (ORG) has a measure of hourly wage.  Since only a third of my linked 
sample is in the ORG in March, this severely limits my sample size.  The March 
supplement also has a measure of annual wages last year and hours worked last year, 
so an hourly wage variable can be constructed for everyone in the linked sample who 
worked last year.  I conducted my analysis using both of these hourly wage measures: 
the self-reported hourly wage variable for everyone in the ORG and the constructed 
hourly wage variable for everyone in both the February and March supplements. 
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The two compensation variables for the CPS sample were created by summing 
each of the two hourly wage variables with  the  individual’s  employer  contribution  
toward health insurance premiums if the individual was offered health insurance at his 
job. 
Since not everyone who is offered health insurance by his employer takes it up 
(resulting in a health insurance contribution of zero dollars by the employer in the 
observed data), but the value of the employer contribution toward premiums had he 
taken up the offer of health insurance should be counted toward his total 
compensation, I had to impute the value of employer contribution toward health 
insurance premiums for those were offered, but did not take up.  This was also done 
by using multiple imputation.  The variables I used in my imputation model were: 
hourly wage, race, ethnicity, potential experience, education, region of residence, 
industry group, occupation group, marital status, and whether the individual has 
children less than six years of age.  As with the NLSY-ECEC cost imputations, I also 
used ten implicates to produce the CPS results.21 
With two hourly wage variables and two compensation variables (constructed 
from the two wage variables) for each individual, I then ran the standard wage 
regressions using each of the dependent variables: 
 
(1) 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒௜) = 𝛽ଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒௜ + 𝛽ଷ𝑋௜ + 𝜀௜  
(2) 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜) = 𝛽ଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒௜ + 𝛽ଷ𝑋௜ + 𝜀௜ 
where 𝑋௜ is a vector of control variables including demographic characteristics and 
industry/occupation depending on the specification.  I ran three different 
specifications, each with a different set of control variables.  The first model                                                         
21 Results produced from using five, twenty, and fifty implicates are not shown, but were qualitatively 
identical. 
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controlled for race, ethnicity, education, potential experience, and region of residence; 
the second controlled for the aforementioned variables as well as industry group, 
occupation group, and firm size; and the third controlled for all the aforementioned 
variables as well as marital status and whether the individual has a child less than six 
years of age. 
 
3.2.2 NLSY Analysis 
The NLSY analysis was done is a very similar manner.  Here I dropped those 
that were not interviewed in 2006 and 2008, those currently enrolled in school, those 
currently in the armed forces, those not employed or employed by non-traditional 
employers, those employed by the government, those not in the labor force for the 
entire year, those who did not work at least 35 hours per week, those with self-
reported negative hourly pay, and those who did not answer the benefit questions.  I 
also trimmed the top and bottom two percent of the wage distribution.  These cuts to 
the data and how many observations were dropped are shown in Table 2.9. 
In Table 2.9, I also show how many additional observations are dropped if 
those in the suppressed cost cells (in the ECEC) are dropped.  Since, the sample size 
with the suppressed cells imputed is twice as large for 2008 and more than three times 
as large for 2006 as the sample size with the suppressed cells dropped, I will show 
estimate my results both for the sample with the suppressed cells dropped and for the 
sample with the cost variables in the suppressed cells imputed. 
The total compensation measure for the NLSY was created by summing hourly 
wage for the main CPS job and the cell specific costs of each benefit the individual 
was offered at his main job.  The regression analysis was done in the same way as for 
the CPS with the only difference being slightly different control variables.  As with the 
CPS analysis, I estimated three different specifications.  The first controlled for race, 
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ethnicity, education, potential experience, region of residence, and SMSA status; the 
second controlled for these variables as well as industry group, occupation group, and 
establishment size; and the third controlled for all of these variables as well as marital 
status, whether the individual has children, and union status.  All of the regression 
analyses were done using sampling weights provided by the NLSY. 
Lastly, as a robustness check, I redid all of the regression analyses using just 
the sample of individuals who reported being married in the relevant year, 2006 or 
2008, and found that this did not make a qualitative difference in the results.22 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 CPS Results 
The summary statistics for the CPS samples I used - the Outgoing Rotation 
Group and the entire linked February/March supplements- are shown in Tables 2.2 
(for 1995) and 2.3 (for 2005).  Not surprisingly, the statistics across the two samples 
look very similar even though the Outgoing Rotation Group sample is just under a 
third the size of the entire linked sample. 
Each group is roughly evenly divided between the genders and the average age 
is about 38 years for the 1995 data and 41 years the 2005 data.  These statistics show 
that there are more black females than black males and more Hispanic males than 
Hispanic females in all samples.  The males are more likely to be married and have 
young children present in the household in all samples.  In the 1995 data, males and 
females are about equally likely to have a college degree, but in the 2005 data, more 
females have a college degree.  The distribution across firm size looks pretty similar in 
                                                        
22 One might think that married men and women are more likely differentially value nonwage benefits 
(especially family-friendly ones) than non-married men and women.  The results (tables available from 
author upon request) show that this is not is the case in these data. 
  
86  
all samples, but women are more likely to be employed by the largest employers 
(those with more than 1000 employees). 
   
TABLE 2.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE CPS (1995) 
  OUTGOING ROTATION GROUP MARCH SUPPLEMENT 
  All Male Female All Male Female 
   49.2% 50.8%   50.5% 49.5% 
Age 38.6 38.5 38.7 39.0 39.1 38.9 
(12.5) (12.3) (12.4) (12.4) (12.4) (12.3) 
Black (%) 9.21 7.95 10.44 8.44 7.13 9.77 
Hispanic (%) 6.64 7.09 6.20 6.19 6.81 5.55 
Married (%) 60.12 63.88 56.48 61.59 65.56 57.54 
Have Children <6 (%) 18.11 19.87 16.41 17.80 19.21 16.36 
College Educated (%) 27.53 27.10 27.95 27.78 27.37 28.18 
Firm Size 1-9 (%) 11.75 11.38 12.10 14.53 15.10 13.96 
Firm Size 10-24 (%) 8.75 9.79 7.75 8.98 9.66 8.30 
Firm Size 25-99 (%) 13.20 13.83 12.56 13.41 14.14 12.67 
Firm Size 100-499 (%) 16.10 16.18 16.02 15.22 14.89 15.56 
Firm Size 500-999 (%) 6.81 6.19 7.41 6.41 5.67 7.16 
Firm Size 1000+ (%) 43.39 42.64 44.13 41.44 40.54 42.36 
Hourly Wage $12.30 $13.90 $10.80 $13.20 $15.20 $11.20 
($7.10) ($7.80) ($6.00) ($8.40) ($9.30) ($6.90) 
Hourly Compensation $13.50 $15.20 $11.90 $14.30 $16.40 $12.20 
($7.80) ($8.20) ($7.20) ($9.10) ($10.00) ($7.60) 
Employer Contribution to Health Insurance $2,988 $3,325 $2,587 $3,031 $3,386 $2,586 
($1425) ($1499) ($1217) ($1479) ($1567) ($1223) 
Have Health Insurance 77.48 77.06 77.88 76.80 76.25 77.35 
Health Insurance from Employer 56.74 62.27 51.37 53.43 57.51 49.28 
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TABLE 2.2:  Continued 
  OUTGOING ROTATION GROUP MARCH SUPPLEMENT 
  All Male Female All Male Female 
   49.2% 50.8%   50.5% 49.5% 
No 
Employer HI 
Employer Offers Health Ins 16.68 11.88 21.33 15.90 11.13 20.76 
Eligible for Emp Health Ins 10.03 6.91 13.06 9.37 6.54 12.25 
Employer 
Health 
Insurance 
Emp. Pay All of Premium 18.11 19.16 17.10 16.22 17.03 15.40 
Emp. Pays Part of Premium 35.01 39.12 31.01 33.88 36.96 30.74 
Emp. Pays None of Premium 1.86 1.99 1.73 1.75 1.77 1.73 
                
Note: Does not include imputed values.  Values in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
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TABLE 2.3: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE CPS (2005) 
  
OUTGOING ROTATION 
GROUP MARCH SUPPLEMENT 
  All Male Female All Male Female 
   49.8% 50.2%   50.8% 49.2% 
Age 41.1 40.8 41.4 41.4 41.3 41.4 
(13.0) (13.0) (12.9) (13.1) (13.1) (13.0) 
Black (%) 8.47 7.42 9.51 8.03 6.91 9.18 
Hispanic (%) 10.13 11.78 8.49 9.57 10.79 8.31 
Married (%) 58.22 61.82 54.65 59.43 63.27 55.46 
Have Children <6 (%) 16.14 17.66 14.62 15.79 17.08 14.46 
College Educated (%) 29.99 28.28 31.68 30.62 28.73 32.57 
Firm Size 1-9 (%) 13.26 13.26 13.60 15.79 16.68 14.86 
Firm Size 10-24 (%) 10.12 11.25 9.00 10.05 10.75 9.32 
Firm Size 25-99 (%) 13.69 14.62 12.77 13.43 14.11 12.73 
Firm Size 100-499 (%) 14.91 14.96 14.86 14.21 14.19 14.24 
Firm Size 500-999 (%) 6.00 5.16 6.83 5.67 5.20 6.16 
Firm Size 1000+ (%) 42.02 40.75 43.27 40.85 39.07 42.69 
Hourly Wage $17.70 $18.70 $15.60 $18.40 $20.70 $16.10 
($15.80) ($10.90) ($9.20) ($12.70) ($14.00) ($10.70) 
Hourly Compensation $19.00 $20.60 $17.30 $20.10 $22.50 $17.60 
($13.50) ($11.70) ($14.90) ($13.70) ($14.90) ($11.80) 
Employer Contribution to Health Insurance $4,873 $5,386 $4,288 $4,922 $5,475 $4,265 
($2326) ($2371) ($2128) ($2372) ($2426) ($2129) 
Have Health Insurance 75.58 74.45 76.70 75.77 74.87 76.71 
Health Insurance from Employer 54.60 57.82 51.41 52.15 54.68 49.54 
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TABLE 2.3:  Continued 
  
OUTGOING ROTATION 
GROUP MARCH SUPPLEMENT 
  All Male Female All Male Female 
   49.8% 50.2%   50.8% 49.2% 
No 
Employer HI 
Employer Offers Health Ins 17.60 14.16 20.99 16.80 13.22 20.49 
Eligible for Emp Health Ins 11.43 9.75 13.09 10.77 8.88 12.73 
Employer 
Health 
Insurance 
Emp. Pay All of Premium 11.48 12.29 10.68 10.99 11.47 10.50 
Emp. Pays Part of Premium 39.31 41.38 37.25 37.69 39.53 35.79 
Emp. Pays None of Premium 1.43 1.59 1.28 1.51 1.53 1.49 
                
Note: Does not include imputed values.  Values in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
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For both years of data, men have a higher average hourly wage and a higher 
hourly compensation using the measure of total compensation I constructed compared 
to women.  Turning to benefits, women are slightly more likely to have health 
insurance from any source, but men are more likely to have health insurance coverage 
from their own employer.  This indicates that women more likely to get spousal 
coverage  from  their  husbands’  jobs,  which  is  consistent  with  the  findings  in  other  
studies (Buchmueller, 1996).  Of those without own employer health insurance 
coverage, women are more likely to be both working in a firm that offers health 
insurance and be eligible for that health insurance.  In other words, again, women are 
more like to not take up offered health insurance and get it from another source.  
These summary statistics seem to indicate that men and women may have roughly the 
same rate of access to health insurance from their employers (similar to results in 
Levy, 2006).  Certainly, the gender gap in access to this nonwage benefit is much 
smaller than the wage gap, but the employer contribution to health insurance for males 
is higher than for females so the gender gap in the value of this benefit is higher than 
the gender gap in access.  Of course, it is well documented in the literature that 
females take up health insurance less than males do because their husbands cover the 
whole family (Buchmueller, 1996-1997).  This is a plausible and likely driver of the 
higher value of employer health insurance contribution for males.  
For 1995, the results from estimating equations (1) and (2) are in Table 2.4 for 
the Outgoing Rotation Group sample and in Table 2.5 for the entire linked sample and, 
for 2005, the results are in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.  The tables show the results for three 
different specifications, each with a different set of control variables, which are listed 
in the tables.  The results across all three of these specifications, across the two 
samples, and across the two years of data show the same basic qualitative result.  
There is no appreciable difference between the gender gap in wages and the gender  
    
TABLE 2.4: 1995 CPS RESULTS (OUTGOING ROTATION GROUP) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation 
       
Male 0.2281 0.2273 0.1628 0.1591 0.1605 0.1557 
 (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0084) 
             
N 11,721 11,721 11,721 11,721 11,721 11,721 
             
Controls             
Black yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hispanic yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pot. Experience yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Group     yes yes yes yes 
Occupation Group     yes yes yes yes 
Firm Size     yes yes yes yes 
Married         yes yes 
Child < Age 6         yes yes 
              
Note: Includes 1,446 imputed values of employer contribution to health insurance premium.   
92 
    
TABLE 2.5: 1995 CPS RESULTS (MARCH SUPPLEMENT) 
       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation 
       
Male 0.2722 0.2686 0.2056 0.2019 0.2007 0.1961 
 (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
             
N 37,105 37,105 37,105 37,105 37,105 37,105 
             
Controls             
Black yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hispanic yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Potential 
Experience yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Group     yes yes yes yes 
Occupation 
Group     yes yes yes yes 
Firm Size     yes yes yes yes 
Married         yes yes 
Child < Age 6         yes yes 
              
Note: Includes 4,309 imputed values of employer contribution to health insurance premium. 
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TABLE 2.6: 2005 CPS RESULTS (OUTGOING ROTATION GROUP) 
       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Hourly 
Wage Compensation 
Hourly 
Wage Compensation 
Hourly 
Wage Compensation 
       
Male 0.1987 0.2006 0.1622 0.1615 0.1567 0.1533 
 (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0084) 
             
N 12,481 12,481 12,481 12,481 12,481 12,481 
             
Controls             
Black yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hispanic yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Potential 
Experience yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Group     yes yes yes yes 
Occupation Group     yes yes yes yes 
Firm Size     yes yes yes yes 
Married         yes yes 
Have Child < Age 6         yes yes 
              
Note: Includes 1,657 imputed values of employer contribution to health insurance premium. 
94 
    
TABLE 2.7: 2005 CPS RESULTS (MARCH SUPPLEMENT) 
       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Hourly 
Wage Compensation 
Hourly 
Wage Compensation 
Hourly 
Wage Compensation 
       
Male 0.2576 0.2528 0.2208 0.2148 0.2116 0.2036 
 (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0060) 
             
N 39,944 39,944 39,944 39,944 39,944 39,944 
             
Controls             
Black yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hispanic yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Potential 
Experience yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Group     yes yes yes yes 
Occupation Group     yes yes yes yes 
Firm Size     yes yes yes yes 
Married         yes yes 
Have Child < Age 6         yes yes 
              
Note: Includes 5,001 imputed values of employer contribution to health insurance premium. 
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gap in compensation when compensation is measured as wages plus employer 
contribution toward health insurance premiums. 
For both 1995 and 2005, the gender gaps in wages and compensation for the 
Outgoing Rotation Group sample are smaller across all three specifications than the 
gender gaps for the entire linked sample.  This likely results from the fact that the 
hourly wage variable is self-reported in the Outgoing Rotation Group sample while it 
is calculated from self-reported annual wages and self-reported total hours worked in 
the larger linked sample.  There is some research on the difference between these two 
CPS hourly wage variables in the literature that finds that there is less measurement 
error in the Outgoing Rotation Group self-reported hourly wage variable (Liu, 2009).  
 
4.2 NLSY and ECEC Results 
Summary statistics for the 2006 and 2008 ECEC data that I used are shown in 
Table 1.8.  Wages are, on average, across all industries, occupations, and firm sizes, 
about 70 percent of total compensation.  The most expensive benefit category, aside 
from legally required benefits (not shown), is insurance.  The main component of 
insurance is health insurance, which is about just over 8 percent of total compensation.  
Paid leave, including vacation days, sick days, and maternity leave, are a close second 
at 7 percent of total compensation after insurance.  Retirement and savings (4.4 
percent) and supplemental pay (2.5 percent) are much smaller categories in terms of 
cost to employers. 
Summary statistics for the NLSY samples I used are shown in Table 2.10 and 
2.11.  The samples within a year (2006 or 2008) are different because these tables only 
include the observations that did not require imputation of benefit costs.  As discussed 
in the methods section, some industry by occupation cells and industry by firm size 
cells were dropped due to the unavailability of ECEC data. 
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TABLE 2.8 COMPENSATION STATISTICS 
    
  
Dollar Amount Percentage 
2006 
Total Compensation $27.54 100.0% 
Wages and Salaries $19.24 69.9% 
Total Benefits $8.30 30.1% 
Paid Leave $1.91 7.0% 
Supplemental Pay $0.69 2.5% 
Insurance $2.26 8.2% 
Retirement and Savings $1.21 4.4% 
    
  
Dollar Amount Percentage 
2008 
Total Compensation $28.87 100.0% 
Wages and Salaries $20.37 69.8% 
Total Benefits $8.81 30.2% 
Paid Leave $2.03 7.1% 
Supplemental Pay $0.74 2.5% 
Insurance $2.45 8.4% 
Retirement and Savings $1.29 4.4% 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.9: SAMPLE SIZES 
     
CUT TO SAMPLE 
2006 2008 
N % N % 
     Drop non-interview 6,793 100% 7,596 100% 
Currently enrolled in school 6,611 97% 7,193 95% 
Currently in armed forces 6,591 97% 7,181 95% 
Drop if not employed or non-traditional 
employers 4,718 69% 5,298 70% 
Drop government workers 5,362 79% 5,215 69% 
Drop if not in labor force for entire year 4,501 66% 4,333 57% 
Drop if not worked at least 35 hours 3,873 57% 3,732 49% 
Drop if hourly pay is negative 3,788 56% 3,654 48% 
Drop if valid skip on benefits 3,788 56% 3,646 48% 
Drop bottom 2% and top 2% of earnings 
distribution 3,634 53% 3,491 46% 
Drop if compensation cells missing 919 14% 1,463 19% 
 
   
TABLE 2.10: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE NLSY (2006) 
 INDUSTRY OCCUPATION CELLS INDUSTRY FIRMSIZE CELLS 
 All Male Female All Male Female 
   50.3% 49.7%   55.8% 44.2% 
Age 44.7 44.8 44.6 44.7 44.7 44.6 
(2.2) (2.2) (2.3) (2.2) (2.2) (2.3) 
Black (%) 30.26 26.50 34.1 29.20 26.26 32.92 
Hispanic (%) 17.88 17.75 18.01 17.97 18.24 17.63 
Married (%) 58.69 64.28 52.87 59.18 64.14 52.90 
Have Children (%) 80.29 78.38 83.27 79.67 79.33 82.36 
College Educated (%) 25.21 27.13 23.25 25.70 26.35 24.89 
Estab Size 1-49 (%) 34.24 33.25 35.25 36.34 36.74 35.83 
Estab Size 50-99 (%) 13.01 12.62 13.41 13.44 13.22 13.73 
Estab Size 100-499 (%) 26.66 26.38 26.95 27.72 27.14 28.46 
Estab Size 500+ (%) 21.79 24.38 19.16 22.50 22.91 21.99 
Union Member (%) 18.32 20.50 16.09 20.09 21.78 17.63 
Hourly Wage $20.00 $23.50 $16.60 $20.70 $23.30 $17.50 
($13.00) ($14.90) ($9.70) ($12.90) ($14.10) ($10.20) 
Hourly Compensation $22.70 $26.60 $18.70 $23.30 $26.20 $19.70 
($15.30) ($17.40) ($11.60) ($15.00) ($16.50) ($11.90) 
Have Insurance (%) 82.12 82.75 81.48 81.98 81.59 82.48 
Have Paid Leave (%) 52.87 49.88 55.94 53.27 49.87 57.59 
Have Profit Sharing (%) 33.99 35.25 32.69 24.12 33.48 34.93 
Have Retirement Benefits (%) 84.14 85.00 83.27 83.31 83.35 83.26 
Note: Does not include imputed values.  Values in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
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TABLE 2.11: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE NLSY (2008) 
 INDUSTRY OCCUPATION CELLS INDUSTRY FIRMSIZE CELLS 
 All Male Female All Male Female 
   45.5% 54.5%   52.0% 49.4% 
Age 46.6 46.6 46.7 46.6 46.6 46.7 
(2.3) (2.3) (2.3) (2.3) (2.3) (2.3) 
Black (%) 29.26 27.78 30.49 28.49 27.09 29.96 
Hispanic (%) 17.24 16.54 17.82 17.35 17.56 17.12 
Married (%) 58.31 62.99 54.41 58.61 62.84 54.16 
Have Children (%) 80.05 77.95 81.8 79.57 77.91 81.32 
College Educated (%) 27.57 27.67 27.49 27.53 26.93 28.15 
Estab Size 1-49 (%) 35.55 34.42 36.49 37.62 37.16 37.37 
Estab Size 50-99 (%) 13.25 12.37 13.98 13.26 12.88 13.66 
Estab Size 100-499 (%) 27.01 27.78 26.36 28.41 27.95 28.89 
Estab Size 500+ (%) 20.41 23.38 18.01 21.07 22.01 20.08 
Union Member (%) 21.02 21.82 20.36 21.63 22.48 20.74 
Hourly Wage $21.98 $24.69 $18.63 $22.13 $24.69 $19.42 
($12.13) ($13.75) ($9.79) ($12.30) ($13.56) ($10.14) 
Hourly Compensation $24.06 $27.84 $20.90 $24.78 $27.72 $21.69 
($14.28) ($16.30) ($11.43) ($14.32) ($15.87) ($11.72) 
Have Insurance (%) 81.69 82.34 81.14 82.25 81.73 82.8 
Have Paid Leave (%) 51.82 50.06 53.28 53.08 51.05 55.23 
Have Profit Sharing (%) 30.9 32.62 29.46 31.25 32.16 30.29 
Have Retirement Benefits (%) 84.65 83.91 85.27 84.66 83.37 86.01 
Note: Does not include imputed values.  Values in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
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Some of the samples are evenly split across gender, but two of the samples are 
skewed and this is probably an artifact of the trimming that I had to do due to the 
ECEC data available.  The NLSY samples (at about 44.7 years in 2006 and 46.7 years 
in 2008) are on average older than the CPS samples, but this has to do with the design 
of the NLSY.  Again, the proportion black among females is higher than the 
proportion black among males.  Men are again more likely to be married, but women 
are more likely to have children in the household.  In the 2006 samples, men are more 
likely to have a college degree, but in 2008, they are not.  This difference is again 
probably due to people shifting industries, occupations, or firms and which 
industry/occupation or industry/firm-size cells I had to drop.  The distribution across 
firm sizes is fairly similar across gender with men slightly more likely to be in firms 
with more than 500 employees.  I note these results may seem different from those 
obtained from the CPS samples, but these are different size categories than those used 
for the CPS samples (where the largest category was 1000+) and firm size was looked 
at in the CPS samples whereas establishment size is the variable here.  Lastly, men are 
more likely to be in unions, especially in the 2006 samples, probably due to the 
occupations they are in. 
Again, the average hourly wage among men is higher than among women and 
the same can be said about the average calculated hourly compensation variable.  The 
distribution in access to insurance (health insurance, life insurance, and dental 
insurance)  at  one’s  job  is  similar  across  the  gender,  but  women  are  more  likely  to  be  
offered paid leave (vacation days, sick days, and maternity leave) in all samples.  Men 
seem generally more likely to have access to profit sharing.  Men also seem slightly 
more likely in 2006 to have access to retirement benefits, but, for 2008, women seem 
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more likely to have access to retirement benefits.  Again, here the gender gap in access 
to benefits seems to be much smaller than the gender wage gap. 
Table 2.12 has the same summary statistics for both the 2006 and 2008 
Industry/Firm Size NLSY samples by whether the individuals were missing ECEC 
cost data (i.e. required imputation of cost data).  From this table, we can see that 
observations requiring imputation were different from those not requiring imputation 
in terms of the following observable characteristics: gender, race, education, 
establishment size, union status, hourly wages, and access to benefits.  These 
differences indicate that simply dropping these observations may bias the final 
estimates. 
Table 2.13 shows the probabilities of having access to a particular benefit 
category both conditional on having access to another category of benefits and the 
unconditional probability.  The take-away from this table is that the probability of 
having access to a benefit conditional on having access to another benefit is higher 
than the unconditional probability for all the benefits, but that the conditioning on any 
of the other benefit categories results in a similar probability.  Also, the conditional 
probabilities for paid leave and profit sharing are far from 100%. 
Results from estimating equations (1) and (2) on the NLSY samples are shown 
in Table 2.14 for the industry occupation cells sample and in Table 2.15 for the 
industry firm size cells sample for 2006 and Tables 2.16 and 2.17 for 2008.  Each table 
shows the coefficient on the male dummy variable from estimation on the sample 
where suppressed ECEC cells were dropped and the sample where the benefit costs for 
these cells were imputed using multiple imputation (highlighted in grey). 
The main qualitative result here is the same as the results from the CPS 
samples.  The estimated gender gaps in compensation are virtually identical to the 
estimated gender wage gaps in all of the samples across both years and across all three 
   
TABLE 2.12: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE MISSING CELLS 
 2006 2008 
 Non Missing Missing Non Missing Missing 
Male (%) 50.3% 62.1% 55.8% 65.0% 
Age 44.7 44.7 44.7 40.8 
(2.2) (2.2) (2.2) (2.2) 
Black (%) 30.26 28.37 29.20 28.20 
Hispanic (%) 17.88 20.30 17.97 19.99 
Married (%) 58.69 59.39 59.18 58.21 
Have Children (%) 80.29 81.55 79.67 74.92 
College Educated (%) 25.21 21.02 25.70 20.44 
Estab Size 1-49 (%) 34.24 45.07 36.34 46.15 
Estab Size 50-99 (%) 13.01 10.48 13.44 11.78 
Estab Size 100-499 (%) 26.66 22.91 27.72 39.64 
Estab Size 500+ (%) 21.79 18.55 22.50 16.93 
Union Member (%) 18.32 24.91 20.09 26.05 
Hourly Wage $20.00 $20.09 $20.70 $23.33 
($13.00) ($16.97) ($12.90) ($14.61) 
Hourly Compensation $22.70  $23.30  
($15.30)  ($15.00)  
Have Insurance (%) 82.12 76.14 81.98 74.92 
Have Paid Leave (%) 52.87 52.18 53.27 52.04 
Have Profit Sharing (%) 33.99 25.75 24.12 23.44 
Have Retirement Ben. (%) 84.14 78.61 83.31 77.86 
Note: Values in parenthesis are standard deviations. 
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TABLE 2.13: BENEFIT CATEGORY CROSS TABULATIONS 
     
2006 NLSY 
Benefit Insurance Paid Leave Profit Share Retirement 
Overall 78.5% 51.9% 29.3% 80.7% 
Insurance   61.0% 34.2% 92.6% 
Paid Leave 92.2%   35.5% 93.2% 
Profit Share 91.5% 62.9%   95.0% 
Retirement 90.1% 60.0% 34.5%   
     
2008 NLSY 
Benefit Insurance Paid Leave Profit Share Retirement 
Overall 78.3% 51.7% 27.4% 81.3% 
Insurance   60.1% 32.1% 93.0% 
Paid Leave 91.0%   31.7% 92.8% 
Profit Share 91.8% 59.7%   93.5% 
Retirement 89.6% 59.1% 31.5%   
          
Note: This table reports the percent of observations that are in column category conditional on being in row category.  Also, 
these samples include those observations that required imputation of benefit costs. 
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TABLE 2.14: 2006 NLSY RESULTS (INDUSTRY OCCUPATION CELLS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation 
Male 0.2661 0.2656 0.2260 0.2249 0.2169 0.2144 
 (0.0340) (0.0346) (0.0353) (0.0357) (0.0354) (0.0358) 
N 919 919 919 919 919 919 
Male 0.2307 0.2176 0.2231 0.2237 0.2045 0.2041 
  (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0200) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0207) 
              
N 3,634 3,634 3,634 3,634 3,634 3,634 
Controls             
Black yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hispanic yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Potential Experience yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region yes yes yes yes yes yes 
SMSA yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Group     yes yes yes yes 
Occupation Group     yes yes yes yes 
Establishment Size     yes yes yes yes 
Married         yes yes 
Have Children         yes yes 
Union         yes yes 
Note: The highlighted cells include the following number of imputed values: 1,549 for insurance benefits, 1,597 for retirement 
benefits, 1064 for paid leave benefits, and 520 for supplemental pay benefits. 
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TABLE 2.15: 2006 NLSY RESULTS (FIRM SIZE CELLS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation 
Male 0.2211 0.2186 0.2080 0.2054 0.1925 0.1887 
 (0.0247) (0.0257) (0.0264) (0.0269) (0.0264) (0.0269) 
             
N 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 
Male 0.2307 0.2213 0.2231 0.2232 0.2045 0.2037 
  (0.0181) (0.0189) (0.0200) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0207) 
N 3,634 3,634 3,634 3,634 3,634 3,634 
Controls             
Black yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hispanic yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Potential Experience yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region yes yes yes yes yes yes 
SMSA yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Group     yes yes yes yes 
Occupation Group     yes yes yes yes 
Establishment Size     yes yes yes yes 
Married         yes yes 
Have Children         yes yes 
Union         yes yes 
Note: The highlighted cells include the following number of imputed values: 1,173 for insurance benefits, 1,230 for retirement 
benefits, 815 for paid leave benefits, and 361 for supplemental pay benefits. 
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TABLE 2.16: 2008 NLSY RESULTS (INDUSTRY OCCUPATION CELLS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation 
Male 0.2940 0.2959 0.2290 0.2280 0.2218 0.2205 
 (0.0228) (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0246) (0.0238) (0.0246) 
N 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 
Male 0.2720 0.2581 0.2418 0.2424 0.2304 0.2308 
  (0.0171) (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0185) (0.0190) 
N 3,491 3,491 3,491 3,491 3,491 3,491 
Controls             
Black yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hispanic yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Potential Experience yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region yes yes yes yes yes yes 
SMSA yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Group     yes yes yes yes 
Occupation Group     yes yes yes yes 
Establishment Size     yes yes yes yes 
Married         yes yes 
Have Children         yes yes 
Union         yes yes 
Note: The highlighted cells include the following number of imputed values: 1,292 for insurance benefits, 1,343 for retirement 
benefits, 903 for paid leave benefits, and 395 for supplemental pay benefits. 
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TABLE 2.17: 2008 NLSY RESULTS (FIRM SIZE CELLS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation Hourly Wage Compensation 
Male 0.2690 0.2702 0.2433 0.2410 0.2344 0.2320 
 (0.0201) (0.0212) (0.0220) (0.0223) (0.0220) (0.0223) 
N 1,463 1,463 1,463 1,463 1,463 1,463 
Male 0.2722 0.2670 0.2421 0.2437 0.2306 0.2322 
  (0.0171) (0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0185) (0.0189) 
              
N 3,491 3,491 3,491 3,491 3,491 3,491 
Controls             
Black yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hispanic yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Education yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Potential Experience yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region yes yes yes yes yes yes 
SMSA yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Group     yes yes yes yes 
Occupation Group     yes yes yes yes 
Establishment Size     yes yes yes yes 
Married         yes yes 
Have Children         yes yes 
Union         yes yes 
Note: The highlighted cells include the following number of imputed values: 836 for insurance benefits, 884 for retirement 
benefits, 594 for paid leave benefits, and 220 for supplemental pay benefits. 
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specifications with different sets of control variables.  Whether benefit costs for the 
suppressed ECEC cells were imputed also does not make a difference to the result 
qualitatively.  In comparison to the CPS results, the estimated gender gaps in all of 
these NLSY samples are similar in magnitude to the gender gaps estimated for the 
entire linked March supplement samples, but larger than the gender gaps estimated for 
the Outgoing Rotation Group samples. 
For 2006, the estimated gender gaps for the industry/occupation group NLSY 
sample are slightly larger than for the estimated gender gaps for the industry/firm-size 
NLSY sample while 2008 is more of a mixed bag.  This can probably be explained by 
which cells were dropped due to lack of ECEC data.  The main result, the absence of 
any appreciable difference between the gender gap in my constructed measure of total 
compensation and the gender gap in hourly wages, holds for all samples, however.  
 
5. DISCUSSION 
The gender wage gap is well documented in the labor economics literature and 
one of the possible explanations sometimes put forth to account for some of this 
observed gap in wages is that women may value more highly other aspects of 
compensation, such as access to employer provided health insurance, more paid leave, 
flexible hours, or child care at work.  In a society where women spend more time on 
childcare activities and assume more of the responsibility of childbearing, it is natural 
to expect that women would value some of these family friendly benefits more than 
men.  Also, women with children might be more interested in making sure the family 
has access to health insurance, the cost of which  (the  sum  of  the  employee’s  own  
contribution  toward  premiums  and  any  lost  wages  to  pay  for  the  employer’s  portion) is 
much cheaper in the group market in which employers procure health insurance than 
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on the individual market.  The difference in cost is due to both dispersion of risk in the 
group market and the relatively favorable tax treatment of employer provided health 
insurance. 
The lack of work on this issue stems most likely from the difficulty in 
measuring the value of nonwage benefits and the resulting lack of data.  In this paper, 
I take two approaches: (1) measuring compensation as the sum of wages and employer 
contributions to health insurance premiums in CPS data and (2) assuming that the 
value of various nonwage benefits is the industry and occupation or the industry and 
firm size specific cost of providing them and measuring compensation as the sum of 
wages plus the cost of benefits individuals in the NLSY have access to at their jobs.  
My results show virtually no difference between the gender gap in hourly wages and 
the gender gap in my constructed compensation measures across all the samples I 
used. 
While this paper is the first to attempt to directly construct measures of total 
compensation in dollar terms at the individual level and estimate gender gaps using 
these measures, it does have several shortcomings, mostly stemming from data issues.  
One of these is the many missing industry/occupation and industry/firm size cells in 
the ECEC data, which forces me to drop many observations in my NLSY samples or 
impute benefit costs for these cells.  Another problem is that the CPS only has 
information on health insurance benefits, which comprises a large component of 
nonwage benefits, but is still only one benefit.  In addition, since males are more likely 
to cover their families with the health insurance plans offered at their jobs, their 
employers are more likely to contribute to a more expensive family plan.  Thus, the 
value of that benefit for men is relatively inflated.  Ideally, what we would like to use 
is the maximum amount that the employer would contribute for health insurance 
premiums for a given individual. 
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The use of industry and occupation specific or industry and firm size specific 
cost data is also problematic because (1) it conceals much firm to firm variation in 
costs (using the public use version of the ECEC data actually exacerbates this problem 
because of the coarseness of the industry and occupation cells in the data) and (2) cost 
to the firm tells you little about person to person variation in intrinsic valuation of 
benefits.  My second measure of total compensation assumes that the value of 
nonwage benefits is the cost to employers of providing them.  Of course, the value of 
benefits is vague and could be defined in many ways and there are many reasons to 
think that the cost of provision under- or over-approximates the true value of the 
benefits to individual employees (i.e. health insurance is cheaper in the group market 
than in the individual market, some employees may not value a particular benefit at all 
that every employee at the firm has access to because of the nature of the benefit, etc.). 
Though I would argue that my approach approximates the value of total 
compensation and is the first attempt that I know of to put a dollar value at the 
individual level on total compensation and provides meaningful evidence on the 
question of whether the gender compensation gap is smaller than the gender wage gap, 
the shortcomings discussed above could explain the similarity between the estimated 
gender gaps in my results. 
Future work could benefit from addressing the weaknesses of this study by 
using finer cost data on benefits or trying to use other approximations, at the 
individual level, of the value of nonwage benefits.  These could include surveying 
people and asking how much they value benefits in terms of lost wages or determining 
how much it would cost for an employee to provide the benefit for himself.  In 
addition, future research would estimate other wage gaps, such as the race and 
ethnicity gaps, using total compensation measures derived using similar methods. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HEALTH ENDOWMENT AND  
PARENTAL INVESTMENT IN SIBLINGS 
 
Chen Zhao23 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Economists have long been interested in how parents allocate scarce 
resources among children with different levels of initial endowment.  If parents are 
interested in maximizing the return on their investment, they might reinforce initial 
conditions, but if parents are more motivated by equity, then they might 
compensate for initial differences.  The existing literature shows evidence of both 
types of behavior.  Either would have implications for studies that use sibling fixed 
effect models and assume no differential treatment by parents of siblings with 
different health endowments. I use six panels of the SIPP (1992-2008) to see how 
differences in health endowments between siblings affect parental investment in 
children in various age groups.  Unlike previous studies, I directly measured health 
endowment as whether the child has any health conditions or disabilities.  I 
measure parental investment as the frequency with which parents do the following 
with each child: read, play or going on fun outings, eat breakfast, eat dinner, 
praise, etc.  Consistent with previous studies, the results show that there is some 
evidence that parents do not invest equally in children of different health 
endowments for at least some of the investments considered, but the evidence is                                                         
23 Author: Chen Zhao, Cornell University, Department of Economics, Ithaca, NY  14853.  Email: 
cz92@cornell.edu  I am grateful to John Abowd, Doug Almond, John Cawley, Shooshan Danagoulian 
and Kevin Hallock for their helpful comments on this project. 
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far from overwhelming.  Moreover, the pattern of parental investment appears to 
differ depending on education level of the parents and the general age range of the 
children. In general, these results seem to indicate that whether parents engage in 
reinforcing or compensatory behavior and, if so, which depends crucially on the 
specific investment.  This is consistent with the heterogeneity in the results 
obtained in previous studies. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 The economics literature has competing theories about how parent allocate 
resources between and invest in children with different levels of initial endowment 
with both reinforcement of and compensation for initial differences as possibilities.  A 
desire to maximize the total welfare of the family might lead to reinforcement of 
initial differences as the expected marginal return of investment in the more endowed 
child is higher compared to investment in the lesser-endowed child.  (Becker and 
Tomes, 1976)   However, parents might be more interested in equalizing differences 
between siblings and invest more in the lesser-endowed child even if the expected 
return on the investment is lower.  (Behrman, Pollack, and Taubman, 1982)  The 
pattern of behavior that parents exhibit, whether it is reinforcing or compensating, has 
important policies implications as well as implications for empirical studies that 
estimate the effect of initial health conditions on short and long term outcomes using 
sibling fixed effect models since these studies assume no differential treatment from 
parents (examples include: Currie and Stabile, 2006; Fletcher, 2013). 
 Broadly defining endowments as inherited initial traits that directly or 
indirectly after future attainment, many studies have empirically tested whether 
parental  investments  are  affected  by  each  child’s  initial  endowment.    The  results  have  
not converged on a consensus.  While some have found no effect of child endowment 
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on parental investment decisions (Del Bono et al, 2008; Royer, 2009; Kelly, 2009; 
Almond and Currie, 2011), some have found that parents compensate for initial 
differences (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 1982; Griliches 1979) and others have 
found evidence of reinforcing behavior among parents (Behrman, Rosenzweig, and 
Taubman 1994; Datar, Kilburn, and Loughran 2010; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1998; 
Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982).  In addition, Hsin (2012) finds no evidence of 
compensation or reinforcement overall, but, after looking by education level, finds that 
less educated mothers exhibited reinforcing behavior while more educated mothers 
behaved in the opposite way, compensating for initial differences. 
 This study uses the 1992-2008 panels (six in total) of the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) to look at how parents invest, in terms of time and 
resources, in siblings with different health endowments.  Health endowment is 
determined  using  the  SIPP’s  Functional  Limitation  and  Disabilities  – Children topical 
module, which asks the designated parent (this is usually the mother) whether each 
child has any of a long list of age-appropriate disabilities, conditions, and disorders.  
Children who have any of these are categorized as having low level of health 
endowment (bad health) in this study and children who do not have any of the 
conditions, disorders, and limitations in the list are categorized as having a high level 
of health endowment (good health).  Parental investment variables come from the 
SIPP’s  Children’s  Well-Being topical module.  The designated parent is asked a long 
list of questions about how often they, the father, and all adults do various activities 
with each of the children in the family.  These include: reading, playing, praising, 
eating breakfast and dinner, going on fun outings, etc.  I examine the pattern of 
behavior exhibited by parents, defined in terms of the frequency of these activities, in 
siblings with different health endowments using family fixed-effect models. 
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  The results show that, for some of these activities, parents do invest differently 
in siblings that have different levels of health endowments.  This offers evidence that 
parents do compensate or reinforce initial differences and would indicate that studies 
using sibling fixed effect models to estimate the effect of childhood health conditions 
on long-term outcomes may be over- or under-stating the true effects. However, for 
most of the investment outcomes, there is no evidence that parents exhibit either 
reinforcing or compensatory behavior.   Furthermore, the actual direction of effect, 
whether parents compensate or reinforce initial differences in endowments seems to 
depend on the specific investment being considered.  This is consistent with the 
previous literature as a whole and indicates that the reason for the disparate results in 
previous empirical studies is the heterogeneity in the measures of parental investment 
that are being used across studies.  Consistent with Hsin (2012), the results also offer 
some evidence that  parents’  behavior  may  vary  depending  on  the  general  age  range  of  
the  children  as  well  as  the  parents’  level  of  education.     
 This study contributes to the existing empirical literature on this topic in 
several ways.  First, rather than using a proxy for parental contributions (such as adult 
outcomes) or looking at the raw amount of time that parents spend with children, I am 
looking at actual meaningful activities that parents do with their children and I am able 
to look at the frequency with which each parent engages in each activity with the each 
child.  These activities include reading, eating breakfast and dinner, going on fun 
outings, and offering praise.  Studies have shown that a parent performing these types 
of activities with children enhances their cognitive home environment and positively 
affects later life outcomes. (Brooks-Gunn and Markman 2005; Davis-Kean 2005, 
Smith et al. 1997)  While the frequency of these activities is not a novel measure of 
parental investment, the only other study that I am aware of that uses similar measures 
was done using British data. 
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 In addition, I also measure health endowment in a different and arguably, more 
meaningful, way than previous studies.  Rather than using a proxy for initial 
endowment or using birth weight, I use whether the child has any actual condition or 
disability.  I argue that siblings that differ from each other in the sense that one has a 
health condition or disability and the other does not is more salient to parents as a 
difference in health endowments than a simple difference in birth weight.  This is 
especially true if the difference in birth weight is not large and neither sibling would 
be  considered  to  be  of  “low  birth  weight.” 
 Another advantage of this study compared to many of the previous studies is 
that by using six panels of the SIPP, I have a considerably larger total sample size and, 
more importantly, larger sample of siblings that actually differ in health status.  Lastly, 
a concern with empirical studies in this literature is that siblings are observed at 
different ages, which may account for any differences in observed parental investment.  
I put the children in my sample into different age groups (0-6, 6-11, and 6-14) so that 
all the siblings being compared are in the same general age group.  By narrowing the 
age range of the siblings that are being compared, this partially mitigates the concern 
that differences in parental investment are attributable to differences in age. 
 The next section will give some background on the competing theoretical 
models and existing empirical literature, section three will talk about the data and 
methods I am using, section four presents the empirical results, and the last section is a 
discussion of the results. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
 Many empirical health economics papers estimating the long-term outcomes of 
childhood health conditions use sibling fixed-effect models and assume that parents 
invest in children with different health endowments equally.  However, the theoretical 
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literature in economics has long argued that parents respond to differences in initial 
endowments in siblings and allocate resources accordingly, depending on preferences 
for equality and resource constraints. 
 Becker and Tomes (1976, 1986) introduced a model in which parents do not 
favor any one of the children in their utility function (child-neutral) and are concerned 
with maximizing the total wealth of each child.  Parents invest in each child’s  human  
capital until the marginal return on human capital equals the return on financial assets 
and then parents allocate transfers so as to offset differences in earnings between 
children.  In this model, if the return on investment in the more endowed child is 
greater, then parents would adopt a reinforcing strategy or invest more in the more 
endowed child.  If the opposite is true, then parents may adopt a compensating 
strategy. 
 The  “separable  earnings-transfer”  (SET)  model  introduced  by  Behrman  et  al. 
(1982) posits that parents have preferences for the distribution of earnings ability 
among their children, not just total wealth (which also includes transfers from 
parents).  Here, depending on initial endowments among children, parental preferences 
for equality versus productivity, and the actual rates of return on investment in each 
child, parents may adopt reinforcing, neutral, or compensating strategies. 
 In addition, Conley (2008) proposed that parental allocation decisions may 
vary by socio-economic class.  In particular, when resources are more limited, parents 
may be more risk averse and the least risky strategy may be a reinforcing one if the 
return on investment in the more endowed child is greater.  In other words, equality 
may be a luxury good that only the well-off can afford and the less well-off may not 
be able to afford to spread resources among all children since that may dilute 
resources to the point of failing to provide any of the children with the means to 
succeed. 
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 While these models  help  to  identify  factors  that  may  drive  parents’  decisions,  
ultimately, the question of how parents allocate resources to siblings with different 
health endowments is an empirical one.  Studies have yielded mixed results.  Griliches 
(1979) finds evidence of compensatory behavior among parents when using adult IQ 
as a proxy for initial endowment.  Specifically, the effects of IQ are found to be 
smaller among sibling pairs than across individuals and the differences decrease as the 
siblings become more alike in terms of age, gender, and genetics.  Likewise, Behrman 
et al (1982) estimates the parental preference parameters of a SET model and also 
finds that parents compensate for initial differences in a sample of adult male twins.  
However, Behrman et al. (1994) finds that schooling attainment was higher for the 
more endowed child using adult earnings and body mass index as proxies for 
investment and endowments and interprets this as evidence of reinforcing behavior. 
 Unfortunately, these older studies all used indirect measures of both initial 
endowments and parental investments and, therefore, require somewhat dubious 
assumptions.  For example, using educational attainment as a proxy for parental 
investments assumes that educational attainment is only affected by parental 
investment and not initial endowments and preferences.  Also, using adult earnings as 
a proxy for initial endowment assumes that, for example, family environment does not 
affect adult labor market outcomes. 
 More recent studies have used birth weight as a more direct measure of initial 
health endowment as well as more direct measures of parental investment.  Almond 
and Currie (2011) uses the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Birth Cohort (ECLS-
B) to look at outcomes such as breastfeeding, well-baby visits, amount of praise and 
affection offered, and disciplinary practices and find no evidence that parents treat 
their low birth weight babies differently from their non-low birth weight babies.  
These results are very similar to those found in Royer (2009), which also used the 
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ECLS-B and finds that measures of neonatal medical care (breastfeeding, NICU 
admission, etc.) did not vary within twins with differences in birth weight. 
 Two other studies that find no evidence of differences in parental investment 
are Kelly (2009), which finds no investment responses (i.e. time spent reading to child, 
etc.) from parents after Asian flu-induced damages in a 1958 British birth cohort 
study, and Del Bono (2008), which finds that models that allow the endowment of 
siblings to affect parental investment in an index child result in very similar estimates 
compared to mother fixed effect models.  Del Bono (2008) does find a significant 
difference for breastfeeding, but the magnitude of the effect is very small. 
Datar et al. (2010) looks at siblings in the National Longitudinal Survey of 
You – Child (NLSY-C) to look at a similar set of outcomes to Almond and Currie 
(2011) and Royer (2009).  While a continuous measure of birth weight yields 
insignificant estimates, they find evidence of reinforcing behavior among parents 
when using a dummy variable for low birth weight status.  However, because of the 
outcomes they look at (breastfeeding, well-baby visits, immunizations, attend 
preschool), the results they find could be due to poorer health in low birth weight 
children (i.e. less healthy children may be seeing specialists for their conditions and 
less likely to be taken in for routine well baby visits).  The authors also look at how 
the presence of low birth weight siblings on outcomes for normal birth weight children 
and only find a significant effect for well baby visits, but this result could be due to 
transaction costs (i.e. the cost of caring for a low birth weight sibling may lessen the 
resources available left to care for the normal birth weight sibling). 
Hsin (2012) uses the Child Development Supplement of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID-CDS) to look at how much time parents spend with each of 
their children and measures health endowment by birth weight.  She finds no evidence 
of either compensation or reinforcement overall, but after taking into consideration the 
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socio-economic background of the families, she finds that while less educated parents 
spend more time with their heavier weight children (reinforcing behavior), more 
educated parents exhibit the opposite behavior (compensating behavior).  She finds 
this to be true of both total time spent with children as well as time spent doing 
educational activities. 
 In addition to these studies using US data, a number of studies have found 
evidence of reinforcing behavior in parental investments across siblings in developing 
countries (Ayalew 2005; Pitt et al. 1990; Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982; Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin 1988).  As these are developing countries, these results would be 
consistent with those in Hsin (2012) for less educated parents. 
 
3.  DATA AND METHODS 
 The data used for this study comes from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP).  The SIPP is a longitudinal survey that is administered in panels 
where each panel is a short panel (usually 2-4 years).  This study uses the 1992, 1993, 
1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels, each of which consisted of 20,000-50,000 
households (the later panels were larger).  Within each panel, the SIPP is conducted in 
multiple waves (usually 9-13 waves) where each wave consists of a set of core 
questions that remain the same for each wave and a set of questions from a topical 
module that changes for each wave. 
For  this  study,  I  use  the  Children’s  Well-Being topical module and the 
Functional Limitations and Disabilities – Child topical module, both of which are 
administered at least once during each of the 1992-2008 panels.  When the topical 
modules were administered more than once within a panel, I used answers from the 
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earliest instance of the topical module to maximize the sample size.24  Since the set of 
questions that I am interested in changes depending on the general age range of the 
child for both of the topical modules that I use,25 I do my analysis by three different 
age groups: 0-6, 6-11, and 6-14.  Because of differences in structure between the 
1992-1993 and 1996-2008 panels, the 1992-1993 panels are only represented in the 0-
6 age group and not the 6-11 or 6-14 age groups.26  The division into age groups is 
explained in detail below. 
 
3.1 Health Endowment Measure 
 The variables used to create the measure of health endowment come from the 
Functional Limitations and Disabilities – Children topical module.  This topical 
module asks the designated parent (usually the mother) a series of questions about 
each child in the family.  These questions differ depending on the age of the child 
being asked about. 
For children age 0-6 in the 1992 and 1993 panels, parents are asked whether 
the child has any developmental conditions requiring therapy or diagnostic services 
and whether the child has any long lasting conditions that limit his ability to walk, run, 
or use stairs.  If parents answer yes to either question, I put the child in the poor health 
endowment group.  Otherwise, I put the child in the good health endowment group.  
For children age 0-6 in the 1996 – 2008 panels, parents are only asked whether the 
child has any conditions that limit ordinary activities.  For this age group in these 
panels, if parents answer yes to this question, I put the child in the poor health 
                                                        
24 Sample sizes for later waves are usually smaller than for earlier waves as the incidence of non-
responses increases. 
25 That is, each question is only asked of children in a specific age range, i.e. age 6-11, and this range 
depends on the specific question. 
26 The Child Well-Being topical module for the 1992-1993 panels did not contain the outcomes measures I use for the age 6-11 and age 6-14 age groups. 
  123  
endowment group and if the parents answer no, then the child is put in the good health 
endowment group. 
 For children aged 6-14, parents are asked a long list of questions regarding 
each  child’s  health.  These questions cover the following conditions, limitations, and 
disorders: 
 
 Learning disabilities 
 Mental retardation 
 Developmental disability 
 ADHD 
 Any other developmental condition requiring therapy or diagnostic services 
 Cane, crutches, or walker 
 Wheelchair or electric scooter 
 Hearing aid 
 Difficulty hearing 
 Difficulty seeing words, letters, with glasses 
 Difficulty having speech understood 
 Long-lasting condition that limits ability to walk, run, participate in sports 
 Difficulty getting around inside house 
 Difficulty getting in or out of bed or chair 
 Difficulty taking bath or shower 
 Difficulty putting on clothes 
 Difficulty eating food 
 Difficulty getting to or using toilet 
 Emotional or mental condition cause difficulty getting along with other 
children 
 Condition that limits ability to do regular school work 
 Ever received special education services 
 
Since these questions are asked about children age 6 to 14, I use the same measure of 
health endowment for the 6-11 and 6-14 age groups.  For both age groups, if the child 
has any of the above conditions, disabilities, or difficulties, then the child is placed in 
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the poor health endowment and children that do not have any of the above are coded 
as having good health endowment.27 
 This mapping of variables from the SIPP by panel and age group is 
summarized in Table 3.1.  
 
3.2 Parental Investment Measures 
 The  measures  of  parental  investment  come  from  the  Children’s  Well-Being 
topical module of the SIPP.  The designated parent is asked a series of questions about 
how often various activities are done with each child.  As with the health questions 
from the Functional Limitations and Disabilities topical model, different questions are 
asked of children in different age groups.  Thus, not all of the parental investment 
outcomes were used for each age group.  Table 3.2 shows which investments 
outcomes were considered for each of the three age groups.  In summary, all of the 
investments were used for the age 0 to 6 age group and only four of the investments 
were used for the age 6 to 11 age groups while the rest were used for the age 6 to 14 
age group. 
 
3.3 Analysis 
 For reasons explained above, the sample was divided into three different age 
groups: 0-6, 6-11, and 6-14.  In each, I only keep those families with more than one 
child in the age group.  Sets of siblings where the children are not all in the same age 
                                                           
27 As robustness checks, I conducted all of my analysis using different ways of specifying the 
bad_health variable.  In one, I only coded children who had more than one of the conditions, 
disabilities, or difficulties as having bad health.  In another, I changed the threshold to more than two of 
the conditions, disabilities, and difficulties.  In a third, I only considered health conditions.  The results 
from these additional analyses did not differ qualitatively from those presented in Tables 5 – 7. 
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TABLE 3.1: HEALTH VARIABLES USED FOR EACH AGE GROUP 
     
Age 0-6 Age 
6-11 
Age 
6-14 Health Variable 1992-1993 Panels 
1996-2008 
Panels 
x    
Developmental condition requiring 
therapy or diagnostic services 
x    
Long lasting condition that limits ability 
to walk, run, or use stairs 
 x   
Any conditions that limit ordinary 
activities 
  x  Learning disabilities 
  x  Mental retardation 
  x  Developmental disability 
  x  ADHD 
  x x 
Any other developmental condition 
requiring therapy or diagnostic services 
  x x Cane, crutches, or walker 
  x x Wheelchair or electric scooter 
  x x Hearing aid 
  x x Difficulty hearing 
  x x 
Difficulty seeing words, letters, with 
glasses 
  x x Difficulty having speech understood 
  x x 
Long-lasting condition that limits ability 
to walk, run, participate in sports 
  x  Difficulty getting around inside house 
  x  Difficulty getting in or out of bed or chair 
  x  Difficulty taking bath or shower 
  x  Difficulty putting on clothes 
  x  Difficulty eating food 
  x  Difficulty getting to or using toilet 
  x  
Emotional or mental condition cause 
difficulty getting along with other children 
  x  
Condition that limits ability to do regular 
school work 
  x  Ever received special education services   
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TABLE 3.2: INVESTMENTS CONSIDERED FOR EACH AGE GROUP 
    
Age 0-6 Age 6-11 Age 6-14 Outcome (Number of Times) 
x* x  all people read to child 
x x  father read to child 
x x  designated parent read to child 
x* x  any kind of outing 
x  x designated parent ate breakfast with child 
x  x father ate breakfast with child 
x  x designated parent ate dinner with child 
x  x father ate dinner with child 
x  x designated parent spent more than 5 min w child for fun 
x  x father spent more than 5 min w child for fun 
x  x designated parent praised child 
x  x father praised child 
        
Note: * Includes 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels.  All others only 
include 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels. 
 
group are excluded from the analysis samples.  A benefit of this strategy is that this 
allows for the comparison of siblings that are closer in age.  A potential issue that one 
may be concerned with in a study like this is that we may observe parents investing 
differently across siblings because the children may be of very different ages at the 
time of the survey.   Only considering siblings that are all in the same age group 
partially mitigates these concerns.28   
In addition, I transform the outcomes for each child such that it is a measure of 
the deviation, for that child, from the mean outcome for his/her age and adjusting for 
the standard deviation.  Specifically,  I  subtract  the  average  value  for  the  child’s  age  of 
the investment outcome from the value for the specific child and then divide the 
                                                        
28 Some may argue that the age ranges are rather large and include children at different stages of 
development, but these age ranges are narrower than what has been used in previous studies. 
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difference by the standard deviation for the age.  By doing this, the outcomes are an 
age-standardized measure of the outcome for each child. 
 While the outcome measures for the bulk of the outcomes were continuous 
variables, I transformed the following outcomes measures to be binary variables 
indicating whether the frequency for the child was above or below the age-specific 
average: designated parents spent more than 5 minutes with child for fun, father spent 
more than 5 minutes with child for fun, designated parent praised child, father praised 
child.29 
For each of the investment outcomes and for each of the age groups, I estimate 
the following family fixed-effect model:   
 
𝐼௜௠ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑒௜௠ + 𝛽ଶ𝑋௜௠ + 𝜏௠ + 𝜀௜௠ 
𝐼௜௠ represents parental investments in child 𝑖 in family 𝑚, 𝑒௜௠ is a dummy variable 
that represents child 𝑖’s  health  endowment  (equals  1  if  the  child  has  poor  health  and  0  
otherwise), 𝑋௜௠ is a vector of child-specific control variables,  controls for family-
specific unobserved factors, and  is the error term.  Controls include age of the 
child, sex of the child, designated parent's health at birth, designated parent's education 
at birth, and  mother’s  age  at  time  of  birth. 
The coefficient of interest is , which represents the effect of poor health 
endowment in one sibling on parental investment.  A negative value for  would 
indicate reinforcing behavior whereas a positive value for  would indicate 
compensatory behavior.  To see if I get the same effects as in Hsin (2012), I also 
estimate the effect of health endowment on investment by maternal education level,                                                         
29 This was done to facilitate analysis because of the way the outcomes were recorded in the SIPP.  
While the other outcomes were measured as the number of times over the last week or the number of 
times over the past month, for these outcomes, the outcomes were measured in categories of frequency 
(never, sometimes, etc). 
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where I define less educated mothers as high school graduate or less and more 
educated mothers as having more than a high school education (some college 
education or more). 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 Sample sizes for each of the age groups are presented in Table 3.3 by whether 
all the siblings in a family in that age group were all of poor health, were all of good 
health, or were of different health endowments.  The number of sibling groups in the 
last group is, of course, particularly important because that is where the variation of 
interest is coming from.  In the age 0 to 6 group, there were 32 sibling groups where 
all had poor health, 10,891 sibling groups where all had good health, and 306 sibling 
groups where the siblings had different health endowments.30  In the age 6 to 11 
group, the sample was larger with 151 sibling groups where all had poor health, 
14,601 sibling groups where all had good health, and 773 sibling groups where there 
was variation in health endowment.  The age 6 to 14 group includes the age 6 to 11 
age group, so the sample sizes are similar, but a bit larger.   
Table 3.4 presents some summary statistics for each age group - 0 to 6, 6 to 11, 
and 6 to 14 - by health endowment and for the group overall.  For each of the age 
groups, sample size of the good health group is much larger than the sample size for 
the poor health group as would be expected.  Also, across all of the age groups, both 
the average age of the child and the average age of the mother at the time of birth as 
well as the average number of siblings in both the age group and in the family as a 
whole does not differ much depending on the health endowment of the child. 
There are several differences between the children with poor health 
endowment and children with good health endowment.  The poor health sample in                                                          
30 These numbers are for all six panels.  The numbers for just the four 1996-2008 panels are similar. 
   
TABLE 3.3: NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS AND SIBLING GROUPS IN EACH AGE GROUP 
  All Panels 1996-2008 Panels   
All Siblings Low 
Health Endowment 
# Siblings Groups 32  31  151  218  
# Individuals 134  127  493  738  
All Siblings High 
Health Endowment 
# Siblings Groups 10,891  10,058  6,473  7,419  
# Individuals 24,584  22,845  14,601  17,315  
Different Health 
Endowments 
# Siblings Groups 306  275  773  941  
# Individuals 697  632  1,773  2,287    
TABLE 3.4: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 AGE GROUP 0-6 AGE GROUP 6-11 AGE GROUP 6-14 
 ALL 
BAD 
HEALTH 
GOOD 
HEALTH ALL 
BAD 
HEALTH 
GOOD 
HEALTH ALL 
BAD 
HEALTH 
GOOD 
HEALTH 
Number of Observations 25,415 642 24,773 16,867 1,692 15,175 20,340 2,097 18,243 
Average Age 2.51 2.91 2.50 8.43 8.51 8.42 9.09 9.25 9.07 
Percent Male 50.4% 59.2% 50.4% 50.2% 66.4% 48.4% 50.4% 66.3% 48.5% 
Num. of Siblings in Age 
Group 1.70 1.75 1.70 1.71 1.74 1.71 1.79 1.82 1.79 
Total Num. of Siblings 2.88 2.84 2.88 2.93 2.95 2.93 2.96 2.99 2.97 
Mother's Age at Birth 29.5 29.5 29.5 29.0 28.9 29.0 28.8 28.7 28.8 
Designated Parent: Disabled 4.8% 16.2% 4.5% 7.7% 15.9% 6.8% 8.2% 17.5% 7.1% 
Designated Parent: HS Grad 26.8% 27.7% 26.8% 26.6% 26.9% 26.5% 26.6% 26.9% 26.6% 
Designated Parent: College 16.8% 13.6% 16.9% 16.5% 12.4% 17.0% 16.1% 12.4% 16.5% 
Designated Parent: Post-
College 7.0% 3.6% 7.1% 6.5% 5.4% 6.7% 6.6% 5.6% 6.7% 
Designated Parent: Married 76.3% 60.1% 76.7% 73.9% 65.4% 74.8% 73.8% 65.7% 74.8% 
Total Household Income $18,920 $15,263 $19,015 $21,114 $17,698 $21,495 $21,139 $17,848 $21,517 
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each of the age groups appears to be much more male-dominated.  Also, the children 
in the poor health sample are much more likely to have a designated parent that is also 
disabled, which is to be expected.  In terms of the socio-economic conditions, the 
designated parent of children in poor health tend to be better educated, have higher 
total household income, and are more likely to be married in all three of the age 
groups. 
Figures 3.1 through 3.4 show the distributions for some of the outcome 
variables for each of the age groups where analysis was done using that outcome 
variable.  In figure 3.1, which shows the distribution for the number of outings the 
child was taken on last week, the bulk of observations for both age groups are in the 0 
to 15 range, but there are also spikes at 20, 25, and 30.  Figure 3.2 shows a similar 
pattern for the number of times the child was read to in total last week, but without the 
spikes after the bulk of observations in the 0 to 10 range.  Figure 3.3 shows that, for 
both age groups, while there is variance in the number of days last week that the 
designated parents ate breakfast with the child, there is a spike at 7 days.  Lastly, 
figure 4 shows that, for the frequency with which the designated parent played with 
the child, while about half of the observations are above and below the average for the 
age 6 to 14 age group, the age 0 to 6 age group is much more skewed with more 
observations above average than below. 
Table 3.5 presents the regression results from estimating the family fixed effect 
models for the sample in the age 0 to 6 group.  In this table, as well as Tables 3.6 and 
3.7, the results are divided into three panels with the top panel for all observations, the 
second panel for the subsample of children in families where the designated parent has 
a high school education or less, and the third panel for the subsample of children in 
families where the designated parents has at least some college education.  For the 
pooled age 0 to 6 sample, the coefficient of interest is insignificant for all of the  
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FIGURE 3.1: DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES: NUMBER OF OUTINGS 
LAST WEEK 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.2: DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES: NUMBER OF TIMES READ 
TO LAST WEEK 
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Figure 2: Distribuion of Outcomes: 
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FIGURE 3.3: DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES: NUMBER OF DAYS LAST 
WEEK ATE BREAKFAST WITH 
 
FIGURE 3.4: DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES: FREQUENCY PLAYED 
WITH (ABOVE/BELOW AVERAGE) 
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TABLE 3.5: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR AGE GROUP 0-6 
  
Read: 
Total 
Read: 
Designated 
Parent 
Read: 
Dad Outing 
Eat 
Breakfast: 
Total 
Eat 
Breakfast: 
Dad 
Eat 
Dinner: 
Total 
Eat 
Dinner: 
Dad 
Fun Times: 
Total 
Fun Times: 
Dad Praise: Total Praise: Dad 
 ALL OBSERVATIONS 
Bad Health 0.157 0.201* 0.0154 -0.0569 0.0946 0.141 -0.139 -0.0799 0.0279 0.0326 -0.0267 0.0994 
 (1.375) (1.937) (0.0992) (-0.781) (0.847) (1.445) (-1.383) (-0.691) (0.148) (0.232) (-0.186) (0.665) 
  Controls            
N 25008 22069 17120 24983 23522 18133 23522 18133 23522 18133 23522 18133 
 LOW EDUCATION 
Bad Health 0.141* 0.296** 0.0843 -0.197** 0.0465 0.297** -0.101 -0.0318 -0.0422 0.0473 -0.0570 0.00791 
 (1.709) (2.408) (0.779) (-2.149) (0.253) (2.204) (-0.590) (-0.228) (-0.132) (0.233) (-0.288) (0.0359) 
  Controls            
N 10790 9107 6236 10775 10159 6878 10159 6878 10159 6878 10159 6878 
 HIGH EDUCATION 
Bad Health -0.153 -0.147 -0.289* 0.129* -0.0261 -0.0855 -0.231** -0.191 0.0424 0.00513 -0.0623 0.125 
 (-1.298) (-1.633) (-1.813) (1.781) (-0.231) (-0.707) (-1.999) (-1.258) (0.195) (0.0282) (-0.350) (0.637) 
  Controls            
N 14218 12816 10803 14208 13363 11163 13363 11163 13363 11163 13363 11163 
Notes: This table shows the coefficient of interest (on an indicator variable for bad health) for each regression equation, where the outcome variable is 
shown at the top of each column.  The top panel shows the results for all observations, the middle panel is for families where the designated parent has a 
high school education or less), and the bottom panel is for families where the designated parent has at least some college education.  Robust standard errors 
in parenthesis; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  Controls include age of the child, sex of the 
child, designated parent's health at birth, designated  parent's  education  at  birth,  and  mother’s  age  at  time  of  birth. 
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investments  except  for  “Read:  Designated  Parent,”  which  is  how  many  times  the  child  
was read to by the designated parents.  For this investment,  is only marginally 
significant at the 10% level and is positive. This result provides evidence that for 
reading parents may be compensating for initial differences in health endowment, but 
there is no evidence that for the other outcomes, parents are reinforcing or 
compensation for initial differences and the sign of the insignificant coefficients are 
neither all positive nor all negative. 
Turning to the low education age 0 to 6 sample,  is positive and significant 
for  the  specifications  with  “Read:  Designated  Parent,”  “Read:  Total”  and  “Eat  
Breakfast:  Dad”  (how  often  the  dad  ate  breakfast  with  the  child)  as  investments,  
indicating compensating behavior among less-educated parents for these outcomes.   
In contrast,  is  negative  and  significant  for  “Outing”  (how  many  times  the  
child was taken on fun outings).  In all three panels in Table3.5, the sign of  for 
“Outings”  is  opposite  to  that  for  the  reading  investments, supporting the general result 
that the specific investment that is considered matters when determining whether 
parents reinforce or compensate.  This makes sense since, for example, reading to a 
child and taking a child on outings are very different in nature.  In the case of outings, 
parents may be reluctant or less able to take children who are sicker on outings 
whereas they are less restricted in their ability to read to children of poor health.  
These differences in restrictions may well vary by socioeconomic class as parents with 
more resources may be more able to overcome the restrictions. 
In contrast to the results for the low education group for the reading 
investments, for the high education age 0 to 6 sample,  is negative and significant 
for  “Read:  Dad”  (number  of  times  child  was  read  to  by  the  dad),  indicating  reinforcing  
behavior.   is  also  negative  and  significant  for  “Eat  Dinner:  Total”  (total  number  of  
times parents at dinner with the child), again indicating reinforcing behavior. Lastly, 
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as touched on before, the coefficient of interest is of the opposite sign (positive) and 
significant  for  “Outing.” 
Altogether, the results in Table 3.5 for the younger age 0 to 6 sample provide 
some evidence that on average, in terms of reading to the child, parents exhibit 
compensatory behavior, but that highly educated parents engage in reinforcing 
behavior.  This would directly contrast the theory in Conley (2008) and the results in 
Hsin (2012).  There is also some suggestive evidence that less educated parents exhibit 
a different pattern of behavior from highly educated parents for outings and eating 
meals together, but it is important to remember this evidence is suggestive at best 
since many of the coefficients fail to attain statistical significance. 
The first set of regression results for the older set of children, the age 6 to 11 
age group, are in Table 3.6.  Here, only four of the investments were considered (see 
Table 3.2) as the results for the rest of the investments are estimated on the age 6 to 14 
age sample.  For the pooled 6 to 11 sample,  is not significant for any of the 
investments.   
Turning to the middle panel, the results for children with less educated parents 
are more interesting.   is positive  and  significant  for  both  “Read:  Total”  (total  
number  of  time  the  child  was  to  by  anyone)  and  “Read:  Designated  Parent,”  (the  total  
number of times the child was read to by the designated parent) indicating 
compensating behavior among parents.  This is consistent with the results on reading 
for  the  age  0  to  6  sample.    For  the  other  reading  investment  variable  “Read:  Dad,”    
is  also  positive,  but  not  significant  and  for  “Outing,”    is insignificant and negative.  
Interestingly, results in the bottom panel for children with highly educated 
parents shows that  is  positive  and  significant  at  the  10%  level  for  “Read:  
Designated  Parent.”    This  indicates  compensating  behavior,  the  same  as  for  the  less  
educated group in this sample.  This pattern of results is different that for the age 0 to  
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TABLE 3.6: RESULTS FOR AGE GROUP 6-11 
  Read: Total 
Read: 
Designated 
Parent Read: Dad Outing 
     
 ALL OBSERVATIONS 
Bad Health 0.0639 0.0106 -0.0714 -0.0310 
 (1.056) (0.170) (-0.704) (-0.674) 
Controls     
N 16834 14020 10134 16834 
     
 LOW EDUCATION 
Bad Health 0.198** 0.155* 0.175 -0.00983 
 (2.034) (1.935) (1.110) (-0.258) 
Controls     
N 7049 5529 3582 7049 
     
 HIGH EDUCATION 
Bad Health 0.0947 0.107* 0.0388 -0.00751 
 (1.468) (1.764) (0.514) (-0.118) 
Controls     
N 9785 8311 6451 9785 
Notes: This table shows the coefficient of interest (on an indicator variable for bad 
health) for each regression equation, where the outcome variable is shown at the top of 
each column.  The top panel shows the results for all observations, the middle panel is for 
families where the designated parent has a high school education or less), and the bottom 
panel is for families where the designated parent has at least some college education.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 
5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  Controls include age of the child, sex of the 
child, designated parent's health at birth, designated parent's education at birth, and 
mother’s  age  at  time  of  birth. 
 
6 age group, where the coefficient of interest on the reading outcomes were of the 
opposite signs for the less educated and more educated groups. 
 Table 3.7 has the results for the age 6 to 14 age group.  Here the rest of the 
investments that were not used for the age 6 to 11 age group are considered.  In the 
pooled age 6 to 14 sample,  is  negative  and  significant  for  “Eat  Breakfast:  Dad”  
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(how often the dad after breakfast with the child), which indicates reinforcing behavior 
among these parents for this outcome.  Interestingly, the point estimate on this 
coefficient was positive, but insignificant for the age 0 to 6 pooled sample, which 
means there is no evidence of either compensation or reinforcement in that age group.  
This, along with the reading results for high education samples, indicates that the 
pattern of behavior among parents may also depend on the age range of the siblings. 
 For the age 6 to 14 low education sample,  is negative (reinforcing) and 
significant  for  “Fun  Times:  Dad"  (how  often  the  dad  played  with  the  child  just  for  fun)  
and  “Praise:  Dad.”    These  same coefficients were insignificant (and positive) for the 
age  0  to  6  age  group.    Also,  while  “Eat  Breakfast:  Dad”  was  positive  and  significant  
for the age 0 to 6 group, it is insignificant (and negative) for the age 6 to 14 age group. 
For the age 6 to 14 high education sample, the coefficient of interest is positive 
and  significant  for  “Praise:  Total”  indicating  compensating  behavior.    This  is  different  
from the age 0 to 6 sample, where this coefficient was insignificant (and negative).  In 
addition,  “Eat  Dinner:  Total”  was  negative  and  significant  for  that  sample,  but  is  
insignificant (and positive) here.  These results are consistent with the above results 
indicating that parental behavior may differ for older siblings versus younger siblings. 
Taken altogether, the results for the older sample, age 6 to 11 or 14 suggest 
that less educated parents may exhibit compensating behavior in terms of the reading 
related investments and hints of reinforcing behavior in terms of the some of the other 
investments (especially, praise and playing together).  There are also hints of 
compensating behavior among highly educated parents in terms of reading and praise.   
   
TABLE 3.7: RESULTS FOR AGE GROUP 6-14 
  
Eat 
Breakfast: 
Total 
Eat 
Breakfast: 
Dad 
Eat 
Dinner: 
Total 
Eat 
Dinner: 
Dad 
Fun 
Times: 
Total 
Fun 
Times: 
Dad 
Praise: 
Total Praise: Dad 
 ALL OBSERVATIONS 
Bad Health -0.0126 -0.0864** 0.0381 -0.0661 0.0598 -0.0933 0.00668 -0.105 
 (-0.379) (-1.969) (0.937) (-1.616) (0.910) (-1.150) (0.106) (-1.253) 
Controls         
N 20301 14593 20301 14593 20301 14593 20301 14593 
         
 LOW EDUCATION 
Bad Health 0.0282 -0.0398 0.0480 -0.0577 0.0654 -0.225* -0.108 -0.285** 
 (0.633) (-0.458) (0.754) (-0.957) (0.805) (-1.927) (-1.208) (-2.307) 
Controls         
N 8632 5495 8632 5495 8632 5495 8632 5495 
         
 HIGH EDUCATION 
Bad Health 0.0565 -0.0563 0.0496 0.0183 0.143 0.0490 0.158** 0.0927 
 (1.479) (-1.256) (1.073) (0.404) (1.536) (0.471) (1.962) (0.865) 
Controls         
N 11669 8934 11669 8934 11669 8934 11669 8934 
Notes: This table shows the coefficient of interest (on an indicator variable for bad health) for each regression equation, where the outcome variable is 
shown at the top of each column.  The top panel shows the results for all observations, the middle panel is for families where the designated parent has a 
high school education or less), and the bottom panel is for families where the designated parent has at least some college education.  Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  Controls include age of the child, sex 
of  the  child,  designated  parent's  health  at  birth,  designated  parent's  education  at  birth,  and  mother’s age at time of birth. 
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In general, however, with so many insignificant coefficients, the results taken 
altogether seem to show that, the specific investment that is being considered is of 
critical importance and there is no evidence of reinforcing or compensating behavior 
among parents for the bulk of the investments considered.  The results also suggest 
that parents may invest differently for older children versus younger children. 
 
4.1 Robustness checks 
One might expect that the results depend critically on how the bad health 
variable is created for each of the age groups.  As robustness checks, for the age 6 to 
11 and the age 6 to 14 age groups, I estimated the results using different variations of 
the bad health variable.  I did not do the same robustness check for the age 0 to 6 age 
group because, depending the SIPP panel, there were only one or two questions used 
to create the variable and, thus, little room for variation.  For the older age groups, the 
results were qualitatively unchanged after changing the bad health variable in the 
following  ways:  requiring  a  “yes”  to  at  least  two  and  at  least  three  of  the  questions  in  
Table 3.1 rather than just one, defining bad health as having one of the health 
conditions in Table 3.1, defining bad health as having one of the difficulties in Table 
3.1, and defining bad health as requiring the use of one of the aids in Table 3.1. 
I also performed the same analysis without age adjusting the investment 
outcomes for each child (described in the data section).  These results are shown in 
Tables 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 (analogous to Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7).  Generally speaking, 
these results look very similar to the results using age-standardized measures of 
parental investment and qualitatively speaking, the conclusions are largely unchanged. 
   
TABLE 3.8: RESULTS FOR AGE GROUP 0-6 (Not Adjusted) 
  
Read: 
Total 
Read: 
Designated 
Parent 
Read: 
Dad Outing 
Eat 
Breakfast: 
Total 
Eat 
Breakfast: 
Dad 
Eat 
Dinner: 
Total 
Eat 
Dinner: 
Dad 
Fun 
Times: 
Total 
Fun Times: 
Dad 
Praise: 
Total 
Praise: 
Dad 
                          
 ALL OBSERVATIONS 
Bad Health 0.0936 0.0818 -0.114 -0.0346 0.0429 0.0961 -0.0114 -0.0155 0.0519 0.0325 0.00875 0.0996 
 (1.333) (1.463) (-0.991) (-0.676) (1.027) (1.588) (-0.540) (-0.467) (0.271) (0.232) (0.0610) (0.668) 
  Controls            
N 25008 22069 17120 24983 23522 18133 23522 18133 25008 18133 25008 18133 
             
 LOW EDUCATION 
Bad Health 0.187** 0.181** -0.00329 -0.0891 0.0192 0.210** -0.00692 -0.0315 -0.0124 0.0476 -0.0147 0.00834 
 (2.185) (2.563) (-0.0274) (-1.299) (0.269) (2.230) (-0.163) (-0.658) (-0.0391) (0.234) (-0.0766) (0.0379) 
  Controls            
N 10790 9107 6236 10775 10159 6878 10159 6878 10790 6878 10790 6878 
             
Bad Health -0.101 -0.0900* -0.296** 0.0478 0.00147 -0.0664 -0.0262 -0.0364 0.0494 0.00332 -0.0433 0.125 
 (-1.373) (-1.718) (-2.374) (1.050) (0.0334) (-0.812) (-1.134) (-0.804) (0.226) (0.0183) (-0.241) (0.634) 
  Controls            
N 14218 12816 10803 14208 13363 11163 13363 11163 14218 11163 14218 11163 
Notes: This table shows the coefficient of interest (on an indicator variable for bad health) for each regression equation, where the outcome variable is shown at 
the top of each column.  The top panel shows the results for all observations, the middle panel is for families where the designated parent has a high school 
education or less), and the bottom panel is for families where the designated parent has at least some college education.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis; * 
significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  Controls include age of the child, sex of the child, designated parent's 
health  at  birth,  designated  parent's  education  at  birth,  and  mother’s  age  at  time  of  birth. 
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TABLE 3.9: RESULTS FOR AGE GROUP 6-11  (Not Adjusted) 
  
Read: 
Total 
Read: 
Designated 
Parent Read: Dad Outing 
     
 ALL OBSERVATIONS 
Bad Health 0.0777* 0.0117 -0.0487 -0.00140 
 (1.658) (0.275) (-0.505) (-0.0395) 
Controls     
N 16834 14020 10134 16834 
     
 LOW EDUCATION 
Bad Health 0.203** 0.0790 0.222 0.0173 
 (2.508) (1.482) (1.201) (0.486) 
Controls     
N 7049 5529 3582 7049 
     
 HIGH EDUCATION 
Bad Health 0.0507 0.0576 -0.0181 0.0111 
 (1.200) (1.298) (-0.249) (0.250) 
Controls     
N 9785 8311 6451 9785 
     
Notes: This table shows the coefficient of interest (on an indicator variable for bad 
health) for each regression equation, where the outcome variable is shown at the top 
of each column.  The top panel shows the results for all observations, the middle 
panel is for families where the designated parent has a high school education or 
less), and the bottom panel is for families where the designated parent has at least 
some college education.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at the 
10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  Controls 
include age of the child, sex of the child, designated parent's health at birth, 
designated  parent's  education  at  birth,  and  mother’s  age  at  time  of  birth. 
   
TABLE 3.10: RESULTS FOR AGE GROUP 6-14 (Not Adjusted) 
  
Eat Breakfast: 
Total 
Eat Breakfast: 
Dad 
Eat Dinner: 
Total 
Eat Dinner: 
Dad 
Fun Times: 
Total 
Fun Times: 
Dad 
Praise: 
Total 
Praise: 
Dad 
 ALL OBSERVATIONS 
Bad Health -0.0442** -0.0807** 0.00784 -0.0155 0.0598 -0.0854 -0.00210 -0.0925 
 (-2.056) (-2.293) (0.868) (-1.181) (0.910) (-1.072) (-0.0325) (-1.265) 
  Controls        
N 20301 14593 20301 14593 20301 14593 14593 14593 
         
 LOW EDUCATION 
Bad Health -0.0104 -0.0502 0.00914 -0.0127 0.0647 -0.186* -0.162* -0.277** 
 (-0.356) (-0.655) (0.682) (-0.645) (0.798) (-1.660) (-1.783) (-2.466) 
  Controls        
N 8632 5495 8632 5495 8632 5495 8632 5495 
         
 HIGH EDUCATION 
Bad Health 0.00365 -0.0485 0.0135 0.00649 0.141 0.0347 0.182** 0.0758 
 (0.159) (-1.381) (1.236) (0.456) (1.513) (0.358) (2.212) (0.924) 
  Controls        
N 11669 8934 11669 8934 11669 8934 11669 8934 
Notes: This table shows the coefficient of interest (on an indicator variable for bad health) for each regression equation, where the outcome variable is 
shown at the top of each column.  The top panel shows the results for all observations, the middle panel is for families where the designated parent has a 
high school education or less), and the bottom panel is for families where the designated parent has at least some college education.  Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.  Controls include age of the child, sex 
of  the  child,  designated  parent's  health  at  birth,  designated  parent's  education  at  birth,  and  mother’s  age  at  time  of  birth.  
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5.  DISCUSSION 
 The question of how parents allocate resources between children of 
different endowments has long been of interest in the economics literature.  
Theories that predict reinforcing behavior and theories that predict 
compensating behavior by parents both exist.  On the one hand, parents may 
want to invest where the marginal return would be highest, which would be in 
the more endowed child (Becker and Tomes, 1976 and 1986).  However, 
parents may also be driven equity concerns and wish to equalize outcomes 
across all of their children, leading to greater investment in the lesser-endowed 
child (Behrman et al., 1982).  Which of these motivations dominate may very 
well depend on the socio-economic status of the family.  In this context, only 
wealthier  families  are  able  to  “afford”  the  luxury  of  equality  in  outcome 
whereas poorer families are better off ensuring that at least one child achieves 
some minimal acceptable outcome and, thus, pursue the strategy of investing 
where the marginal returns are the highest (Conley, 2008; Hsin, 2012). 
In contrast to the theories predicting either reinforcing or compensating 
behavior, the health economics literature looking at the long run effects of 
childhood health has made frequent use of sibling fixed effect models assuming 
that parents invest equally in children of differing health endowments.  As 
Almond and Currie (2011) discuss in their recent Handbook of Health 
Economics chapter, if parents compensate for initial health endowments, then 
those fixed-effects estimates would understate or serve as a lower bound of the 
true effects, but if parents reinforce initial differences, then the fixed effects 
estimates would be more problematic because they would represent the 
combination of the true underlying effect and the effect of parental reaction to 
differences in endowment. 
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 The previous empirical literature on this question finds evidence of all 
of the possible patterns of behavior – neutral, reinforcement, and compensation.  
The older studies using indirect measures of both initial endowments and 
parental investments have found both that parents compensate (Griliches, 1979; 
Behrman et al, 1982) and that parents reinforce initial differences (Behrman et 
al., 1994).  More recent studies have used more direct measures of both initial 
health endowment and parental investment.  Several of these have found no 
evidence of either compensating or reinforcing behavior (Del Bono et al, 2008; 
Royer, 2009; Kelly, 2009; Almond and Currie, 2011) while Datar et al (2010) 
found that parents reinforce and Hsin (2012) finds that less educated parents 
reinforce while more educated parents compensate.  Studies of developing 
countries have generally found evidence of reinforcing behavior (Ayalew 2005; 
Pitt et al. 1990; Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1988). 
 The results from this study are not consistent with any of the previous 
studies in isolation, but are consistent with the literature as a whole.  There are 
a few main takeaways.  First, I find some evidence that parents do not invest 
equally in children of different health endowments. As discussed, this indicates 
that sibling fixed effect studies of childhood health conditions on long-term 
outcomes may be over- or under-stating the true effects. 
However, most of the investment outcomes I looked at yield insignificant 
estimates of the coefficient of interest, providing no evidence of either 
reinforcing or compensating behavior.  In addition, the actual direction of 
effect, whether parents compensate or reinforce initial differences in 
endowment is unclear in this study.  Instead, the pattern (reinforcement or 
compensation) seems to depend on the specific investment being considered.  
My results as a whole look similar to the previous literature taken altogether 
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and sheds some light on how to interpret results from previous similar 
empirical studies, which all use very specific investments and offer seemingly 
contradictory results.  These results would indicate that the reason for the 
disparity in previous estimates is the heterogeneity in the specific set of 
investments that are being considered in each study.  This should not be 
surprising.  Some of the investments used in this and previous studies may 
inherently be limited in that less healthy children may naturally be less able or 
likely to partake in spite of whatever their parents’  intentions  are.    Examples  
include outings and well-baby visits. 
My results also offer some evidence that  parents’  behavior  may  vary  across  the  
children’s  age  group  (age  0  to  6  versus  age  6  to  11/14)  as  well  as  parents’  
education level (those with a high school education or less versus those with at 
least some college education).  Of course, it is important to note that a 
weakness of this study is that I have no way of knowing whether the 
heterogeneity in results across age groups is the result of the children’s  age  
group or how I am measuring health endowment in each age group.  
Nonetheless, the results in this study show that parental behavior in response to 
children with different health endowments is very context dependent and there 
may not be a simple answer. 
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